

# INTRODUCTION

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Iraq today is divided into a 'Green Zone' and a 'Red Zone'. The Green Zone is where the Americans and their coalition partners are housed. It is a suburb of Baghdad, heavily guarded, with fountains and palaces, palm trees and grass. It is there that American and British officials, who are not allowed to leave the zone, busily plan the future of Iraq. Everywhere there are notices, which say: 'What have you done for the Iraqi people today?' The Iraqi government and ministries are housed partly in the green zone and partly in mini-green zones throughout the city – requisitioned buildings that are heavily guarded.

The rest of Iraq is the Red Zone. It is full of activity – people, shops, meetings, kidnappers and bombs. It is a mixture of debate and self-organisation, extremism and crime. In the Red Zone, there is deep mistrust and suspicion of those in the Green Zone. Rightly or wrongly, the Coalition and its Iraqi partners are blamed for everything and many people find it easier to sympathise with the insurgents than with the Coalition forces. But those inside the Green Zone refuse to believe that these views exist.

The Green Zone and the Red Zone can be used as a metaphor to describe the gulf that exists on a global scale between the global green zones, where the political elites live and occasionally meet in summits, and the global red zone – a heterogeneous complex world characterised by what Fred Halliday (2002) calls 'global rancour', the frustration, humiliation and powerlessness experienced by millions of men and women not only in the Middle East but all over the world. The war in Iraq revealed this gulf between the green zone and the red zone, in particular the gulf between those governments that went to war and global public opinion. Indeed, the gap between the global green zone and the global red zone, as we shall argue, overshadows the more publicised cleavages between the West and global Islam and between North and South.

Global civil society can be understood as one mechanism for crossing the divide between the red zone

and the green zone. It consists of various channels – groups, movements, organisations – through which people living in the red zone try to influence the elites in the green zones. In 2003–4, the war in Iraq brought global politics into the domestic arena of nearly every country. It led to renewed efforts to overcome the green-red divide through democratic accountability. The debate about Iraq had a powerful impact on domestic debates not only among those countries sending troops, such as the United States, Britain, Spain, Italy, South Korea and Japan, but also in Muslim countries, where conflict between different factions was exacerbated (as in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia), and in countries where the role of the US is hotly debated (as in Latin America). In several countries, its preparation and aftermath actually affected electoral outcomes – the German federal elections of 2002, the Spanish elections of 2004, the European Union parliamentary elections in 2004, and, of course, the US presidential election in November 2004 (although, at the time of writing, we do not know how).

What is happening, in our view, is not a reversal of globalisation but a recasting of sovereignty and democracy in a global context. Globalisation does not mean the end of the state, as many authors point out (Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 2000). What it means is the transformation of the state, the emergence of a new kind of global politics in which the state is one actor among many; and this in turn has profound consequences for the content and functioning of democracy. Moreover, the state changes in different ways, and at varying paces, in different places and different societies. The war in Iraq, it can be argued, is one of those pivotal events which reveal the contradictory nature of the underlying processes.

In this chapter, we want to show why a focus on global civil society helps us to understand what is happening. It is a way of studying global processes 'from below', from the point of view of individual agency. We start by explaining what we mean by global civil society, and describe current developments with the help of our data

collection effort (see Records section). We next consider the implications of the emergence of global civil society for sovereignty and democracy. Finally, we apply these conclusions to the situation in the Middle East and set out two possible future directions for globalisation.

## Revisiting global civil society

In *Global Civil Society 2001*, rather than providing a definitive definition, we offered the Yearbook as a continuing platform for an exchange of ideas about the meaning of 'global civil society' (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001). We did so because we believe that debating the meaning of the term contributes to an open and self-reflexive global civil society in the end. We defined global civil society, for operational, descriptive purposes only, as a sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market, and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies.

But we were always clear that the concept of global civil society has a normative meaning and that the boundaries of the normative concept are contested. For us, civil society is about managing difference and accommodating diversity and conflict through public debate, non-violent struggle, and advocacy. Historically, civil society was bounded by the state; it was about managing difference within a bounded community and about influencing the state. What we mean by global civil society is not just civil society that spills over borders and that offers a transnational forum for debate and even confrontation; rather, we are concerned about the ways in which civil society influences the framework of global governance – overlapping global, national and local institutions. Some theorists prefer the term 'transnational' to 'global'. But by 'global' we mean more than just 'beyond borders': we refer to the ways in which globalisation has transformed the issues and problems that we face and the role of civil society in confronting them.

One way of understanding this definition is to revive the notion of a social contract. Historically, the concept of civil society referred to those societies which were ruled on the basis of a social contract among its citizens (consent), in contrast to those based on coercion or those without rulers. Civil society could thus be defined as the medium – the various organisations, groups and individuals – through which a social contract is negotiated and renegotiated between individual citizens on the one hand and the centres of power and authority on the other. Up until the middle of the twentieth


century, the state was the centre of power and authority. Nowadays, power and authority is dispersed among different layers of governance (see Kaldor, 2003).

This way of understanding civil society helps us to understand its changing meaning over time. In the eighteenth century, civil society referred simply to a society characterised by a social contract; it really referred to a gentlemanly political elite, perhaps elected on limited suffrage, which debated and deliberated about key decisions. In the nineteenth century, Hegel and later Marx defined civil society as the arena between the state and family. The economy was included in this definition because of the growing political role of the newly emerging bourgeois class and the bargaining process that was taking place between state and capital. And in the twentieth century, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci further narrowed the definition to the arena between the economy, the state and the market in recognition of the political role played by workers' movements. For Gramsci (1971), political parties were a part of civil society; he advocated a strategy of conquering the realm of culture and ideology as a way of strengthening the political position of the Communist party.

Nowadays, civil society has come to refer to non-party politics. And this is a reflection of the global nature of civil society in the twenty-first century. The term 'civil society' re-emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century as a reaction against the state and against political parties, which were blocking access to decision-making at state level. The term 'civil society' came to refer to a variety of groups, organisations and individuals who tried to get around the state blockage at local, national and global levels. And this is what we tend to mean today when we use the term.

Understood in this way, the term 'global civil society' can be viewed as a way of recognising how politics has moved beyond the national level. In Chapter 1 of this Yearbook, Anderson and Rieff criticise this understanding and argue that the idea of global civil society is a dangerous fallacy given the absence of representative institutions at a global level. They suggest that the various groups and organisations that call themselves 'global civil society' claim to represent world opinion and to substitute for the functioning of representative democracy at national levels, and that this claim is profoundly anti-democratic. In particular, they suggest that global civil society gets to be equated with a particular group of what might be described as cosmopolitan universalists, standard-bearers of 'environmentalism, feminism, human rights, economic regulation, sustainable development' (p. 29). These 'social movement

Figure I.1: Left and right vs globalisation



missionaries' have arrogated to themselves a supposed legitimacy that does not and cannot reflect the aspirations of individuals worldwide.

They have a point. Even if we envisage global civil society as a broad arena for political debate, efforts to give substance to the concept (like the Records section of this Yearbook, which measures international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), participation in parallel summits or global meetings, and records global civil society events) do tend to give precedence to the 'nice guys', the new global activists, even though we try to include extremist movements, representatives of political establishments and other kinds of civic institutions as well. What makes our approach different, however, is our emphasis on political positions. What we aim to show, especially in our Issue chapters, is the diverse character of the global political debate, how political stances on specific topics, like oil or democracy, reflect a deeper position on globalisation. In the process of undertaking research for the Yearbook, we have identified four positions on globalisation that appear to run through a number of widely different issues, and

which we keep refining, based on our findings.

The first position is the Supporters of globalisation: those who embrace interconnectedness in all fields – economic, political, legal, and cultural – and who believe we are moving towards world government. The second position is the Rejectionists, those who oppose growing interconnectedness in all fields and want to defend the nation-state. What we have discovered is that very few groups or individuals are pure Supporters or Rejectionists; mostly they favour interconnectedness in some fields and not in others. Our last two positions are therefore mixtures. The Regressives support interconnectedness only when it can be used to strengthen particularist interests; generally Regressives also want to defend the nation state. Thus, Regressives may support free trade but not free migration and not the extension of international law. And the final category is the Reformers – these are the people usually identified as making up 'global civil society'. They support interconnectedness and the construction of global governance as a way of benefiting the many rather than the few. They support the extension of international law, especially relating to

human rights, for example, but may favour constraints on the movement of capital.

Another way of categorising these positions is in terms of left and right, cosmopolitan and particularist. It is often argued that, under the impact of globalisation, the terms 'left' and 'right' are no longer meaningful. The space for resource choices by governments is constrained by global markets. Policies of 'structural adjustment' and 'transition' or 'convergence criteria' make it difficult for traditional 'left' governments to carry out their commitments to redistribution. The left become conservatives and the right become the new radicals, pioneers of the global market (Giddens, 1995). The real choices are about whether or not to embrace globalisation, between multilateralism and unilateralism, between cosmopolitanism and particularism. What we are arguing is that these positions have to be combined. 'Left' and 'right' do remain meaningful terms at the global level but they have to be combined with positions on globalisation. This is illustrated in Figure I.1.

The vertical column represents Supporters and Rejectionists, with Supporters at the top and Rejectionists at the bottom. The horizontal axis refers to Left and Right; on the Left are those who favour redistribution and on the Right are those who favour the free market. The Reformers are in the top left-hand square – they are the cosmopolitan universalists, the people who are usually identified with 'global civil society'. They favour individual rights, including economic and social rights, rather than states' rights. All the other squares represent various forms of Regressive position. In the top right-hand corner are those who favour globalisation when it benefits a particular class – global capital. In the lower left-hand corner are those who favour redistribution within a national framework. And in the lower right-hand corner are those who favour a particular national or sectarian class or grouping.

When we discuss global civil society, we refer to the whole range of positions even though, because of our own biases, we tend to emphasise the role of Reformers. In this Yearbook, we discuss those positions in relation to the debate about oil. Thus, Regressives and Rejectionists tend to emphasise the importance of oil: the former are ready to go to war for oil and destroy ecosystems and the latter oppose oil extraction because it leads to war and environmental degradation. Reformers and Supporters, on the other hand, argue that there are better ways to secure energy supplies than through war and environmental degradation, and that alternatives can be found and managed. Chapter 8, on labour movements, describes how trade unions are trans-

forming themselves, in the face of cultural and bureaucratic inertia as well as political differences about North and South, formal and informal, industry and services, from Regressive or Rejectionist to Reformist positions.

### The debate about the war in Iraq

How are these positions reflected in the debate about the war in Iraq since it began in 2003? Mazlish (forthcoming) offers three possible frameworks for a future world society. One is American society, or 'Global America', and the deep entrenchment of American political, social and cultural institutions in many key countries of the world as well as in international organisations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank. Mazlish sees a profound paradox: the US, which has been so instrumental in making globalisation possible, is increasingly unwilling to live as a citizen in the very world it created. Thus, falling back into notions of national identity and sovereignty, the US seemingly assumes a quasi-imperial role in the mould of Regressive globalisation.

A second possible framework is what Mazlish labels 'Global Islam', and the attempt of elites and their militant followers in the Islamic world to react to internal modernisation failures by seeking to establish a more global cultural and political presence in the name of religious devotion and tradition. Global Islam is not supported by economic forces, however, but is primarily about the export of internal conflicts and failures to the outside world, including Africa, Asia, and of course Europe and the US. It is another form of Regressive globalisation.

Mazlish's final framework is the victory of multilateralism and what we call the 'reformist' and 'supportive' tendencies in global civil society. This would include a vibrant global civil society, with a loosely coupled international order (for example, a reformed UN system), permeable and multicultural national states with the rise of regional governments such as the EU, and a strong presence of global market institutions and corporations. The problem with such a framework is that it tends to assume the narrow but 'nice' definition of global civil society.

In the run-up to the war in Iraq, the gap between Global America and global civil society overshadowed the conflict between Global America and Global Islam, a conflict which Mohamed El-Sayed Said describes as the 'clash of civilisations' hypothesis. In Chapter 3 he

argues that 'the spectacular rise of the anti-war movement during 2002–3 was instrumental in preventing the full triumph of the "clash of civilizations" and "crusade" theories in Arab minds. Furthermore, global civil society offered a brilliant opportunity for voicing Arab protests against injustices seen to be inflicted upon the Arab world by the present international system' (p. 60). As a result, he notes 'a shift in position towards global civil society by a small but growing segment of the Islamic movement' (p. 61). In effect, the West was no longer seen as monolithic – the involvement of Muslims along with Western peace activists offered a political space where it was possible to oppose both American neo-conservatism and fundamentalist Islam.

The simple-mindedness and instrumentalism of the Bush vision of spreading democracy may be ridiculed, but the anti-war movement has offered no alternative

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to romanticise the anti-war movement and to make the kind of claims that Andersen and Rieff criticise. The anti-war movement has tended to be one-sided, to put more emphasis on its opposition to American policy than on opposition to terror and dictatorships. The Middle East has, up to now, been untouched by the wave of democratisation experienced in other parts of the world. The Bush administration claims that its goal is to democratise the Middle East. Because the anti-war movement opposes the US, it has allowed the Bush administration to get away with the rhetoric of democratisation. The simple-mindedness and instrumentalism of the Bush vision of spreading democracy may be ridiculed, but the anti-war movement has offered no alternative – in fact, the lack of democracy in the Middle East hardly seems to be recognised as a problem in these circles.

The continuing war in Iraq is played out as a conflict between two forms of Regressive globalisation. On the one side are the supporters of Global America. On the other side is a mixture of militants from the former Iraqi regime and from extreme Islamic groups, who are beginning to coalesce around a kind of new Islamic nationalism. There is sometimes a tendency among those who opposed the war to gloat over the tragedies in Iraq because they mean failure for the US. Some

parts of the anti-war movement have even been collecting money to support the so-called 'armed resistance' in Iraq. Far from being Reformist, as Mazlish suggests, the anti-war movement could also join the ranks of Regressive globalisers by contributing to the polarisation of world views.

Yet there is an emerging civil society in Iraq. There are groups and individuals, both religious and secular, who are trying to build a democratic Iraq (see Box I.1). Many of these people operated underground in the Saddam years and argued that a strategy similar to that adopted in eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s could have been a better way to undermine the regime. The last years of Saddam's reign were post-totalitarian; it was no longer possible to insulate Iraqi society from outside pressure. Civil society groups argue that they knew a coup was impossible; but a slow strategy of eroding or strangling the regime from within with outside support might have achieved a more peaceful and therefore more secure transition to an open society. Some supported the war because they believed it was the only way to topple Saddam Hussein. But, at the time of writing, when Coalition and its Iraqi allies have lost all credibility, many of them are beginning to see Global Islam as their protector (Kaldor and Said, 2004). There is a real risk that the polarisation between Global America and Global Islam will squeeze out the space for these groups – which is why the role of the anti-war movement in supporting peaceful change could be so important.

Beyond Iraq, the chapters by Arab authors in this Yearbook do suggest ways in which global civil society could help to expand what El-Sayed Said calls the 'associative space' and start opening up societies in the Middle East. In Chapter 2 Heba Raouf Ezzat argues that this requires a reconceptualisation of civil society so as to encompass multicultural perspectives. Indeed, she echoes Anderson and Rieff in her criticism of the dominance of Western universalising ideas. She insists that the religious and the civil must be integrated. And she points to historic Islamic entities like the *Waqf* (endowments) as modern and non-secular institutions that need to be considered as manifestations of civil society in an Islamic context.

At the same time, the description by Mohamed El-Sayed Said of the human rights movement in the region, strengthened by defections from the left and networked across and beyond the region, is reminiscent of developments in Latin America and central Europe 15 years ago. This suggests that, as in Iraq, similar strategies for opening up society might be more likely to initiate a democratisation process than the methods proposed by the Bush

### Box I.1: Civil society in Iraq

Very little was known about Iraqi society under Saddam Hussein; two loud voices tended to dominate – the regime and the exiled opposition. Ironically, they were both broadcasting the same message: any act of dissent was liable to be discovered and brutally punished. The aftermath of the war revealed a different picture. In its waning years Saddam's regime was post-totalitarian. Along with other state institutions, its repressive apparatus had decayed, rather like that of the Communist regimes of eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. This allowed some to explore spaces vacated by the regime for various expressions of civil society – including dissent.

There were, for example, informal groups gathered around disillusioned ex-Baathists. The Hewan (dialogue) Gallery was established by Qasim Al-Sabti, an artist and committed Baathist until he resigned in protest over the invasion of Kuwait. The gallery was a place where artists could exhibit their work and find foreign buyers. It also featured a cafe where they met to talk. Some of those who frequented Hewan were more openly opposed to the regime than others. The Najeen (survivors) group, for example, was comprised of young artists who did not conceal their disgust with the regime. Their leader, Basim Al-Hajjar, was expelled from the final year at the Academy of Visual Arts for refusing to make a sculpture of Saddam Hussein for his graduation project. Hewan enabled Najeen and others like them to appear in public, voice their opinions and exhibit their work. Hewan is still a favourite meeting place for Iraqi artists. After the war Najeen went on to stage the first play in the still-smouldering building of the Al-Rasheed Theatre.

Another example is the group which met every Wednesday at the house of Ali Al-Dabbagh, a former mid-level Baath party official. The group was comprised of both current and ex-Baathists and would debate political and theoretical issues. One member of the group was arrested and executed, but they continued nevertheless to meet. The main point of Hewan and the Wednesday group was not so much the level of their opposition but the fact that they offered a public space that was outside the regime's discourse.

Mosques and seminaries offered similar spaces. Shia clerics continued to feel the full force of the regime's repression until its last days. That did not prevent them from emerging as the main source of moral authority among the Shia; Grand Ayatollah Ali-Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shia, is arguably the most influential person in Iraqi politics today. Sunni clergy, too, were active in building an independent public sphere. Abdul Al-Salam Al-Kubaisi, who runs a seminary in the Baghdad district of Al-Aadhamiya, describes a strategy that was aimed at isolating the regime rather than confronting it head-on. He says this strategy was working and that the regime was on the verge of collapse before the war. Today, Al-Kubaisi is a leading member of the Council of Muslim Clerics, a group that aspires to be the political wing of the insurgency in the Sunni areas.

The existence of these spaces suggests that fear of repression is not sufficient to explain the lack of a more visible opposition in Iraqi society under Saddam. Most Iraqi elites, including intellectuals and professionals, supported the regime implicitly or explicitly. Some kept a low profile and stayed out of politics. Others played along in anticipation of handouts or career advancement. At times, it seems that the regime tried to bribe the entire middle class. Some refrained from attacking the regime out of nationalist motives, fearing that its collapse would jeopardise the country's integrity and independence. Some Iraqi intellectuals speak about feeling guilty for not doing more to topple the dictator.

People like 'Salam Pax' – who became known worldwide as the Baghdad Blogger – were, perhaps unsurprisingly, rare. In September 2002 this anonymous young Iraqi began posting accounts of daily life in Baghdad on the Internet, a web diary that, being critical of Saddam's regime, could have cost him his life.

Whatever Iraqis felt about the regime, they were not ready to fight for it, as the lack of Iraqi resistance to the invading Coalition forces revealed. The Iraqi military did exactly as instructed by the Coalition: they laid down their arms and went home. Something similar happened to the entire state apparatus. In many ways the Iraqi state ceased to exist on 9 April 2003. But Coalition troops were not prepared to fill the resulting security and political vacuum. Initially, they were not even willing to do so. Chaos ensued with mobs stripping, dismantling and burning almost every state and public building. Iraq teetered on the brink of primordial chaos.

Even in the depths of that moment, which many described as the darkest in the country's troubled history, there were civic initiatives: workers stayed in their factories to prevent looting; museum employees took valuable artefacts home to protect them; local youths organised neighbourhood-watch groups; imams organised search parties to

collect and return looted medicine and equipment to hospitals. Indeed, this is how firebrand cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, who later launched an armed insurgency against the occupation, started his activity in post-Saddam Iraq.

Eventually the worst of the criminal chaos died down. The relative stability may well have been the cumulative result of the various initiatives that Iraqis undertook to step back from the brink. However, many came to the conclusion that Coalition troops were all that stood between a semblance of peace and total anarchy.

Despite continuing unrest, today Iraq is bustling with self-organised groups and political debates. Initially, exile parties that had organised clandestine activities under the regime were the most visible. The Iraqi Communist Party newspaper, *Tariq Al-Shaab*, was the first to be distributed in Baghdad, days after the fall of Saddam. It has since been followed by an estimated 200 titles. Secular groups and parties are strongest at the national level and within new government structures. Since they are largely composed of exiles and have little capacity for mobilisation, and because they are seen to be too close to the Coalition forces, they are increasingly disconnected from society. Religious groups, especially those with a nationalist agenda like Al-Sadr and the Council of Muslim Clerics, are gaining ground.

Although officially disbanded, the Baath Party and the former regime are omnipresent. Thousands of followers and recipients of favours, not to mention the regime's henchmen, would find it difficult to admit they have been wrong all these years, or they feel nostalgic. Many ex-Baathists have joined radical Islamic parties and groups that are associated with the insurgency in one way or another. Others are seeking to re-enter the political mainstream. An example of the latter is the Beit Al-Hikma (house of wisdom) think tank. Under Saddam it manufactured ideology on both domestic and international issues for the regime. Today, with its former managers in exile, it is trying to forge a new role, relying on the intellectual potential of its members who represent some of Iraq's leading political and social scientists.

There is a plethora of old and new democratic and civic initiatives. Among students, for example, there is the General Union of Students (GUSIR), which was founded in 1948 and existed underground in the Saddam years. They are campaigning to restore Iraqi schools and universities, correct the injustices of the regime and protect students' rights vis-à-vis the new authorities. For example, they campaigned for the return of student hostels occupied by Coalition troops while arranging alternative accommodation for out-of-town students. They also succeeded in forcing the Minister for Higher Education to recognise students' right to organise.

There are several human rights groups in Iraq today. Some, like the Organization of Free Political Prisoners, have moved from cataloguing the regime's crimes and accounting for its victims to investigating human rights violations by Coalition troops. The Municipal Council in Ammara is tracking down the regime's henchmen, who moved at the end of the war, to make sure they do not disappear into society. The council is also monitoring local government and organising clean-up and neighbourhood-watch initiatives.

Women are probably the best-organised segment of Iraqi society. One consequence of Saddam's war adventures and brutality is that women constitute 60 per cent of Iraq's adult population. Many women feel empowered by the opportunity to influence their country's future. They have also benefited from the Coalition's policy of paying all public sector employees salaries, which exceed their pre-war levels by a factor of thirty. Women are heavily represented in this sector. This is creating a new dynamic in society, since many men have lost their source of income in the private sector and the military. At the same time, women are threatened by terrorist and criminal violence, forcing many to stay at home. Some religious activists who have gained prominence since the collapse of the regime are promoting policies that would circumscribe women's freedoms. For example, there was an attempt to refer family matters to religious Sharia Courts. A coalition of women's groups, led among others by Hana Edward of the Iraqi Al-Amal Association, campaigned successfully against this. Women's groups also succeeded in inserting a clause into the interim constitution mandating that women constitute 25 per cent of all governing bodies – six out of 30 ministers in the current government are women. On 16–17 June 2004, Al-Amal gathered some 360 women activists from across the country to devise a strategy for their engagement in the political process.

If the continuing violence is to be stopped, civil society needs to fill the political vacuum left by the regime and build a legitimate alternative both to the occupation and to the perpetrators of terror.

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administration. Indeed, it is the job of global civil society as much as governments to engage in such a process. Both Raouf Ezzat and El-Sayed Said stress the importance of cyberspace – electronic publications, chatrooms and weblogs – in opening up links with global civil society. Raouf Ezzat's argument underlines the methodological importance of recording those elements of civil society that cannot easily be counted. Illustrating this empirically, El-Sayed Said describes the emergence of an Egyptian anti-globalisation movement as well as an array of formal and informal networks and individuals that are components of this common campaign.

The other side of the supposed divide, Global America, can also do with opening up. This may seem a peculiar assertion, as the US is a functioning democracy, with a free media and a high percentage of the population with Internet access. However, although the US is a nation of immigrants, parts of it remain curiously isolated and ignorant about the lives, world views and dilemmas of non-Americans. Of course, as Karl W Deutsch's adage reminds us somewhat humorously, the true test of power is one's capacity of being able to ignore information. In this sense, the relative isolation of parts of US society outside elite academic and policy circles may well be a function of its dominance. Indeed, what little information the US population gets about the outside world derives mainly from a narrow band of 'Regressive' news sources: 22 per cent of Americans now receive their daily news from talk radio, a mix of interviews and commentary by right-wing talk-show hosts, who make no pretence of presenting unbiased information (*NOW with Bill Moyers*, 2004). An equal percentage gets most of its news from the conservative Fox News Channel. Not surprisingly, there is a large overlap between Fox viewers and Republican voters (Pew Research Center, 2003). Whether these people would vote differently, or change their minds on unilateralism and the war on terror, if they were more exposed to views from the outside world is an open question. The fact is that they are not so exposed.

Some of those who opposed the war in Iraq, especially among the American churches, do make a concrete effort to expose middle Americans to different information and views, with speaking tours and conferences. Moreover Fahrenheit 9/11, Michael Moore's provocative film, is widely showing in the mid-West. These efforts need to be supported by groups and individuals in other parts of the world. Perhaps because the United States is seen as the global hegemon, there is a tendency to treat it differently from other parts of the world. Liberals and radicals are, it seems, willing to interfere and 'strengthen' civil society everywhere except in the United States.

Unlike Islamists, conservative unilateralists in the US are given up as lost causes. In order to really meet the challenge of averting the 'clash of civilizations' that Regressive globalisers believe in and long for, global civil society should attempt to include and persuade middle Americans as much as Islamists. This is all the more important because in an age of global hegemony all world citizens have a stake in the US elections, but only Americans have a vote in them.

### Individuals and identities

In order to deal with the complexity and multi-faceted nature of global civil society, most scholars focus either on a specific thematic field or on a particular organisational form. Some, particularly those oriented towards data-gathering and quantitative research, have focused on international NGOs (for example, Anheier and Themudo, 2002). Others, mainly on the left, have focused on global social movements (Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht, 1999; Cohen and Rai, 2000; Hamel et al. 2001; Buttel and Gould, 2004). Yet others focus on networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Diani and McAdam, 2003; see also the chapter on networks by Anheier and Katz in Part 4 of this Yearbook).

We have tried in this Yearbook to give space to all three approaches. However, each of them, even in combination, tends to see global civil society through an organisational lens, thereby giving short shrift to individuals, their attitudes and actions. Therefore, we try in this edition to give more explicit attention to the role of the individual in global civil society, with Chapter 6 on 'pioneers' of global civil society by Paola Grenier, and some analysis here and in Chapter 2 by Raouf Ezzat of the identity and role of the individual. For, as Raouf Ezzat puts it, 'it is, after all, the individual who decides to communicate, network, act and move, travel and demonstrate, and embrace notions of moral responsibility on a global scale. She or he transcends national boundaries, and bridges different public spaces – domestically and globally' (p. 46).

### Geographical identities

Few terms have been used and misused more in the globalisation literature than 'individual' and 'cultural identity'. Huntington's thesis of multicultural erosion of America's cultural core refers to identity, as does Mazlish's Global Islam, and so do major theorists like Appadurai, Beck, Giddens and Held. While commentators like Huntington (2004) paint the image of an erosion of

Table I.1: Geographic identities 1981–1999/2000

Region	N*	1981			1990			1999/2000		
		Local	National	Supra-national	Local	National	Supra-national	Local	National	Supra-national
Sub-Saharan Africa	2				53	32	16	52	38	11
Middle East and North Africa	1				45	46	9	42	45	12
South Asia	1				52	39	9	42	53	5
East Asia and Pacific	3				51	46	4	58	37	5
Latin America and the Caribbean	3				44	42	14	45	39	16
North America	2	67	7	27	49	36	16	47	35	18
Western Europe	18	63	28	9	61	28	10	63	28	9

World Bank income groups	N*	1981			1990			1999/2000		
		Local	National	Supra-national	Local	National	Supra-national	Local	National	Supra-national
High-income	22	64	25	11	59	31	10	62	28	9
Upper-middle-income	3				56	33	11	57	33	10
Lower-middle-income	3				53	39	8	41	48	11
Low-income	2				51	35	15	50	42	8

Note: Figures indicate percentages of respondents self-identifying as local, national, and supranational.  
 \* Denotes number of countries surveyed.  
 Sources: EVS 1981, 1990, 1999; WVS 1990/1, 2000 (European Values Surveys and World Values Surveys, URL).

national identities, others like Saul (2004) see a rebirth of nationalism, also suggested by Kaldor and Muro (2003), who have pointed to an increase in religious and nationalist militant activity in nearly all parts of the world. The image evoked is one a fragility and uneasy change. But are geographic identities indeed on the move and, if so in what direction?

Two long-standing strands of social science theory shape today's understanding of individual identity. One is rooted in developmental psychology and sees identity as the result of 'deep socialisation', that is, early value-forming experiences and learning processes that make up the core personality traits and character dispositions.

This psychological understanding is close to what could be called the 'hard-wired' aspect of identity as a sense of self – once formed, it is fairly stable throughout the life course and relatively resistant to political, cultural and social changes.

The other understanding of identity is more socio-logical and cultural in nature and sees it as the outcome of ongoing search processes. Individuals try to forge, negotiate and reconcile their own world views and notions of self with that of society. Given the multiple roles people perform in modern, diverse societies, this more 'soft-wired' form of identity is not only evolving, it is also precarious and precious. It refers less to identity

as 'self' than to identity in relation to categories such as nation, religion, place, or belonging.

Research on identity and globalisation is conducted within these two traditions, with the general assumption that 'individuals increasingly have complex loyalties and multilayered identities, corresponding to the globalization of economic and cultural forces and the reconfiguration of political power' (Held and McGrew, 2000: 35). Cultural anthropologists and psychologists have explored the 'deeper' facets of identity formation, but usually in respect of one specific place or culture. Such research, of which Appadurai (1996) is exemplary, suggests that indeed globalisation is having an impact on self-formation, largely by increasing dissonances between cultural 'similarities' and 'difference' that are separated from territorial units. The equation of space, community and meaning is being eroded and can serve ever less as an anchor between primary and secondary socialisation, that is, between hard- and soft-wired facets of identity. Subject to a barrage of media, advertising and other images, people learn to confront such dissonances by creating imagined worlds that offer 'a series of elements (characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives, their own as well as those of others living in other places' (Appadurai, 1990: 299). Similarly, Beck (2000: 54) suggests that 'more people in more parts of the world dream of and consider a greater range of possible lives than they have ever done before', thereby dissociating their identity from territorial communities.

To what extent do survey results support the changing notion and relationships of identity? To approach these questions, we assessed available survey research from a wide range of sources in an effort to identify data-sets that allow for the greatest number of comparisons both cross-nationally and longitudinally<sup>1</sup>. Among the surprising findings about changes in identities is first and foremost the stability of responses to identity-related questions over time, at the regional level and for income groups. This is in contrast to the more fluid picture suggested by analysts such as Beck

or Appadurai. As Table I.1 shows, 63 per cent of the population in western Europe expressed local identities in 1981, 61 per cent in 1990, and 63 per cent in 1999/2000. Likewise, the relative shares for national and supranational identities have remained stable over the last 30 years. For Turkey, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America, the same stability prevails over the last 20 years, as it does for the group of high-income and middle-income countries.

At the same time, there are indications that identities are shifting, yet at different rates and directions, and by no means in any dramatic way. As Table I.1 indicates, South Asia (India) saw an increase in national identity and a decrease of local identity, as did Sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, South Africa), but with a decline in supranational identity. What is more, both lower middle-income and low-income countries see an increase in national identity. Taken together, the findings suggest the absence rather than presence of a general shift in identity as a result of globalisation. Where shifts have taken place, they are more likely the result of national political developments (South Africa) or continued nation-building (Nigeria, India).

Within Europe (Table I.2), we see the emergence of a dual identity whereby over half of the respondents state 'national and European' or 'European and national' as opposed to national identities only. What is more, the dual identity is more pronounced among the younger cohorts (51 per cent) than Europeans aged 55 and above (42 per cent); among the well-educated (57 per cent) than less well-educated (39 per cent); and higher among the self-employed, managers and professionals than among the unemployed and retirees. This would support our controversial finding, in *Global Civil Society 2001*, that global civil society is most developed in Europe: Europe, it would seem, with dramatic exceptions such as the Balkans throughout the 1990s, is rich in 'rooted cosmopolitans' who are comfortable with multiple identities.

In terms of identification as 'Global Citizen' (Table I.3), respondents in the Environics study were split between one-quarter who regarded themselves as global citizens and three-quarters who did not. Global citizens are most frequent in Germany, Canada, Russia, the UK, Italy, Sweden, and South Korea, with about one-third of respondents, and least frequent in Indonesia, Brazil and Chile, with about one in ten. Of course, there is much more to the question of identity than can be suggested with the help of survey data. Nonetheless, two closely related conclusions emerge. The results do not suggest a significant shift in national versus global

Table I.2: National and regional identities, European Union, Autumn 2003

		Nationality only	Nationality and European	European and nationality	European only
Sex	Male	35	49	9	5
	Female	44	45	5	2
Age	15-24	33	48	10	4
	25-39	33	51	9	4
	40-54	39	49	7	4
	55+	49	42	4	3
Employment	Self-employed	32	52	8	5
	Managers	24	57	12	4
	Other white collars	31	56	7	3
	Manual workers	44	44	6	4
	House persons	49	42	4	2
	Unemployed	44	40	8	3
	Retired	49	41	5	3
Education	Below high-school	53	39	4	2
	High-school	42	45	6	3
	Post-secondary	25	57	10	5
TOTAL		40	47	7	3

Note: Figures show percentages of respondents self-identifying as national and European.

Source: European Opinion Research Group (2004)

identities across the board; rather, they point to a slower and more diverse process that varies between as well as within countries. Moreover, national identities seem stronger in weaker economies and more peripheral countries, as well as among poorer population groups generally, which opens opportunities for Regressive globalises such as Global Islam or nationalism in the US. By contrast, local and supranational identities seem more pronounced in richer, more developed countries, and among the educated and well-to-do.

### Secularisation or a revival of religion?

Islamic authors (Raouf Ezzat; AnNa'im, 2002) have argued that mainstream research on global civil society, including this Yearbook, has been too secular in its orientation, missing the importance of religious motivation and religious concepts in global civil society, even in ostensibly secular movements. In order to judge the exigency of the question of religion in global civil society, we need to assess whether the world at large is becoming more or less religious. It turns out that both are happening, but greater emphasis on religion affects more people around the world than secularisation does. There is greater importance attached to religion in

Table I.3: Identification as global citizen

	Yes	No
Argentina	21	79
Brazil	13	87
Canada	34	66
Chile	15	85
France	23	77
Germany	36	64
India	28	72
Indonesia	11	89
Italy	41	59
Japan	25	75
Korea, Rep. of	30	70
Mexico	27	73
Nigeria	23	77
Russia	31	69
Spain	19	81
Sweden	30	70
Turkey	18	82
United Kingdom	31	69
United States	28	72

Note: Figures show percentages of respondents identifying (or not) as global citizen.

Source: Environics International (2002)

Table I.4: Changes in importance of cultural elements

Region	N*	Work 1990	Work 1999	Family 1990	Family 1999	Leisure 1990	Leisure 1999	Religion 1990	Religion 1999
Sub-Saharan Africa	2	87	82	92	97	49	44	76	83
Middle East and North Africa	1	59	69	87	97	24	41	61	77
South Asia	1	86	78	77	93	17	29	49	57
East Asia and Pacific	3	58	54	78	81	21	25	11	11
East and Central Europe	11	54	61	79	80	29	23	19	19
Western Europe	15	56	54	84	87	40	40	20	18
Latin America and the Caribbean	3	73	79	87	94	34	47	42	53
North America	2	61	53	92	95	43	41	42	46
Grand Total	38	60	60	83	86	34	34	27	28

Note: Figures show percentages of respondents identifying cultural elements as important.

\*Denotes number of countries surveyed.

Source: Environics International (2002).

Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Mexico (Table I.4). Such a rise in religiosity is much less evident in most of Central and eastern Europe. Slight increases in religiosity are detectable in the US. The growth of religion in Asia, the Middle East and Africa is less along highly institutional structures (eg the Catholic Church hierarchy), but within less institutional religions like Protestantism and Islam. The former emphasises local community and individualism, the latter, similar to social movements, the notions of brotherhood and communal suffering, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia. In western Europe, by contrast, the importance of religion dropped in twelve out of fourteen countries, with only Portugal showing an increase, and Sweden basically steady. Thus, the world is drifting apart on the issue of religion. Most critically, the countries of north west Europe we identified as centres of global civil society are moving in an opposite direction to the rest of the world. The success of discussions and accommodations between secular and religious worldviews may therefore be pivotal to the success of global civil society as a normative idea in coming years.

## Democracy and Sovereignty

A major theme of *Global Civil Society 2004/5* is democracy. There is a tendency in popular usage to assume that civil society and democracy are the same thing. But is this true? Contemporary civil society is global. But

democracy, if by this we mean the establishment of representative institutions, is necessarily bounded at national and local levels. So does the global character of twenty-first century civil society help or hinder democracy?

In political theory, a distinction is often drawn between the *procedures* and the *substance* of democracy. Procedural democracy includes elections, parliaments, separation of powers, rule of law, and so on. As Hilary Wainwright points out in Chapter 5, substantive democracy is about political equality – the extent to which individual citizens can influence the decisions that affect their lives. Most theorists would argue that procedural democracy is a precondition for substantive democracy – claims that substantive democracy can be achieved without procedures are typical of totalitarian regimes.

Procedural democracy is territorially bounded. Democracy is based on group of citizens who are generally defined in territorial terms. The citizens who live in a particular territory vote for their representative institutions. These institutions have the responsibility for rule-making. The big problem associated with globalisation is that, with the possible exception of the US, fewer and fewer rules are made by national parliaments. Parliaments no longer represent the main centres of decision-making. Power, as we have argued, is increasingly dispersed among different levels of governance. Thus, even if procedures are perfect, substantive democracy – the ability of citizens to influence the decisions that affect their lives – is

necessarily limited at the national level because fewer significant decisions are taken at the national level.

Substantive democracy requires an active civil society, an arena where people can express themselves freely, organise associations, and try to influence decision-makers. Civil society is a 'voice not a vote' (Edwards, 2003). Civil society increasingly spills over borders and reacts to, feeds on and contributes to the process of globalisation. In other words, the simple linear relationship between civil society and democracy is broken. What does this break imply for the future of democracy?

In Chapter 1, Anderson and Rieff (p. 30) argue that civil society organisations are the 'glory of democratic societies, but they are not the electoral institutions of democracy'. The various groups, networks, institutions and organisations that compose civil society offer individuals a chance to express their opinions, however extreme, and to speak and act according to their consciences, without concern for the realities of power or the compromises and adjustments that inevitably have to be made in elected assemblies. At a global level there are no representative institutions, nor should there be, since it would not be possible to represent the peoples of the world in one parliament. Therefore, say Anderson and Rieff, the term 'global civil society' is dangerously misleading; it suggests that a particular section of world opinion, the Western universalising section, has arrogated to itself the claim to represent the world's people.

How might we unpack these issues at different levels of governance?

### National democracy

The paradox of the current epoch is that, at the very moment when procedural democracy is spreading, decision-making at a national level is being 'hollowed out'. The last two decades have witnessed the fall of Communist regimes and the spread of democracy, in particular the decline of military governments, in Asia, Latin America and Africa. This phenomenon, it can be argued, is linked to globalisation and, indeed, to global civil society. It has become increasingly difficult to insulate societies from the outside world; pressure of trade, travel, indebtedness, as well as increased communication, have made closed authoritarian states much harder to sustain. Pressure for democratisation has been partly a result of pressures from above; international financial institutions, outside governments, and international donors have demanded political reform alongside market reform. More importantly, pressure for

democratisation has come from below, from civil society groups that have been able to expand the space for their activities through links with the outside world. Keck and Sikkink (1998) talk about the 'boomerang effect' whereby civil society groups can use their links with the outside world to put pressure on their own governments.

At the same time, however, we can also observe growing apathy in many countries, in the form of a decline in voter turnouts or in political party membership as well as pervasive distrust in elected officials. This phenomenon too can be linked to globalisation. It may have something to do with the limited powers of elected representatives at the national level and the disappointment of voters with politicians who often do not or cannot carry out electoral promises because their freedom of manoeuvre is narrowed. It also may have something to do with global civil society, since many activists who feel blocked at the national level by traditional political parties or by the constraints of power at the national level, choose to focus their energies on local and global issues, thus reducing the level of public debate and action at the national level. The growing tendency for populist parties and movements to form around national or religious issues may also be linked to the decline of substantive democracy since national or religious issues may make it possible to mark out political difference in societies where socio-economic political difference are circumscribed by the global economy. A typical phenomenon in many parts of the world is 'illiberal' or 'cosmetic' democracy, where formal procedures have been introduced but where substantive democracy is extremely weak.

However, a new phenomenon has been the mobilisation of global civil society to influence elections. Even if parties are weak, activists in various movements and NGOs have increasingly organised themselves to invigorate voting behaviour. This phenomenon was first noticed in the Rock the Vote campaign in Slovakia, when civil society activists with international support campaigned to get people to vote in the 1994 elections, in order to remove the nationalist elected dictator Meciar. This experience was copied in Croatia and led to the defeat of the Croatian extreme nationalist Party, HDZ; and later it was copied in Serbia through the young people's resistance campaign Otpor. During 2003/4, as shown in Box I.2, we can observe increasing examples of civil society groups mobilising in elections. Thus, the Otpor activists from Serbia, with financial support from George Soros, introduced their tactics in Georgia and this led to the removal of Edward Shevardnadze. Likewise in India's 2004 elections, a coalition of social

### Box 1.2: Protest voters

In an era of voter apathy, particularly in many industrialised countries, a funny thing happened in 2003/4. Voters realised, as if for the first time, that power lay in their hands. Around the world hundreds of thousands raised placards in protest and millions marked crosses on ballot papers. What galvanised them into action? A new crop of citizens and advocacy organisations, often technologically smart and with global reach, are using the Internet, email and mobile phones to mobilise ordinary people to exercise their rights – at the ballot box, on the streets, or face-to-face with their political representatives.

During 2003–4, Georgians took to the streets in the ‘Rose Revolution’ that forced out their president; India’s marginalised groups helped the Congress Party to victory; angry Spaniards ousted the government that had led them into war in Iraq; Britons dealt the Labour administration a bloody nose in local elections. Even Argentines, who in recent years have expressed their hostility to political authority in a wave of protests, expressed renewed faith in elections in 2003. This was a year when, around the world, voters – frustrated, volatile and increasingly mobilised – spoke truth to power.

The results of many elections and opinion polls around the world suggest that voting behaviour was influenced by several factors: the US/UK war in Iraq, its messy aftermath and the spectre of ongoing terrorist attacks. If, in 2003, opposition to the war on Iraq emerged as a unifying force, in 2004 it became a global issue, mobilising people not only to demonstrate but also to change their political preferences, or simply cast a vote they might not have done otherwise. In the British local elections, which the incumbent Labour government argued were more about rubbish collection, policing and street lighting, Iraq was a key concern for many voters. On 10 June they dealt Labour a sharp rebuke. Labour received 26 per cent of the vote, trailing third after the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. It was their lowest share of a local election vote for decades – in an election when turnout went up (*BBC News*, 2004).

The Spanish parliamentary elections in March 2004 provided more dramatic evidence of how Iraq was influencing voter behaviour. Almost 90 per cent of Spaniards had opposed the war on Iraq. Then came a series of bomb blasts that ripped through crowded commuter trains in Madrid’s rush hour, killing 190 people and injuring 1,500. In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, premier José María Aznar blamed ETA, the Basque separatist organisation, while dismissing the possibility of Al-Qaeda involvement. When it was revealed that, in fact, the bombers did have links to Al-Qaeda, many Spaniards accused the government of suppressing the information to avoid an anti-war backlash at the polls (Richburg, 2004). On 13 March, a ‘day of reflection’ preceding the election, more than 11 million people thronged the streets of Spain’s major cities to mourn the victims and protest against the terrorist attacks. That evening, hundreds of people gathered outside the governing Popular Party’s headquarters in Madrid, accusing the government of covering up the investigation into the bombing. Political protest had been forbidden on this ‘day of reflection’, with punishment threatened for any demonstrations. As one demonstrator said:

*But what if it is just the result of a spontaneous crush of SMS messages? The use of big media, which have been greatly tendentious in some cases, has not been as powerful as text messaging to spread the news and ask for the truth in the most intensive days of democracy in Spain. (Dominguez, 2004)*

Mobile phone traffic increased 40 per cent that weekend, a rise attributed to the text-led protest (Castells, 2004). Rallying via SMS – called ‘smart mobs’ by Howard Rheingold (2002) – has significant precedents. In 2000 a million Filipinos, galvanised by a deluge of text messages, gathered in the capital, Manila, to demonstrate against then president Joseph Estrada. And the year before, in Seattle, mobile phones and the Internet played a key role in the protests against the World Trade Organisation by the nascent anti-capitalist movement. On 14 March 2004, the day after their mass mobilisation, Spaniards voted Aznar out of office and elected the Socialist Party, led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. At 77 per cent, turnout was 8.5 per cent higher than in the 2000 general election.

Spain’s election will have been closely watched in America by a new crop of citizen and voter associations that are mobilising voters in the run-up to the presidential election in November 2004. These civil society groups are targeting two constituencies that they believe can swing the vote: the young and politically disaffected; and all of those who, such is their frustration with government policies or politics generally, would be reluctant to vote. MoveOn.org, a web-based advocacy group, is using the Internet to mobilise and coordinate people who want to volunteer, donate, lobby their representatives and vote in the forthcoming US election. Created in 1998 by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, Wes Boyd and Joan Blades, MoveOn.org grew out of public frustration with the impeachment

process; after the impeachment of president Clinton it turned to electoral action. Under the strapline ‘citizens making a difference’, MoveOn.org used word-of-mouth emailing to mobilise voters and donors. To date, more than 1.7 million people have signed up and, through a secure website, donated US\$8,880,000 in campaign contributions.

*MoveOn PAC’s campaign contributions provide financial assistance to support congressional candidates who embrace moderate to progressive principles of national government. Our intention is to encourage and facilitate smaller donations to offset the influence of wealthy and corporate donors . . . MoveOn.org’s intention is to provide individuals, who normally have little political power, to aggregate their contributions with others to gain a greater voice in the political process. (MoveOn PAC, URL)*

The League of Pissed Off Voters (URL) is another web-based American organisation, which aims to engage 17–35-year-olds in the democratic process in order ‘to bring about a progressive governing majority in our lifetime’. Via an online network, the League offers virtual and physical resources, including voter guides and conventions for ‘voter organisers’, who will in turn educate their peers on why they should vote.

Opinion polls show that American disenchantment with the Iraq war and its aftermath is growing. How far it will influence the presidential election remains to be seen. It is not the only issue attracting global solidarity.

International support bolstered Georgians who were struggling against a corrupt and undemocratic regime. Parliamentary elections in November 2003 returned President Eduard Shevardnadze to power but voting irregularities were so widespread that even the main opposition candidate, Mikhail Saakashvili, was unable to vote. More than 100,000 people camped out on Tbilisi’s streets, listening to speeches by the Saakashvili and other opposition figures, refusing to move, and putting flowers in the barrels of soldiers’ guns. The ‘Rose Revolution’ forced Shevardnadze to resign, the election result was annulled, and in the January 2004 rerun of the elections Saakashvili secured more than 96 per cent of the vote (Mikhail Saakashvili, URL).

Argentines also succeeded in changing the balance of power in their 2003 elections. Since 2001 Argentina has experienced a wave of demonstrations against an economic crisis that has left 50 per cent of people below the poverty line and more than 20 per cent unemployed. Around the country workers have taken over factories declared bankrupt by their owners. It was at one of these factories, just days before the election in 2003, that police attempted to evict women textile workers. The confrontation ended in violence but far from being deterred, some 25,000 protesters regrouped the following day (Vann, 2003). This was the context in which Argentines voted in the presidential election of May 2003. They are required by law to go to the polls and in recent years disenchantment with politics has led millions to cast spoiled or blank votes. However, in 2003 only 500,000 blank or contested ballots were cast compared with four million in the 2001 legislative elections. Nestor Kirchner won the presidential election by default after Carlos Saul Menem, the former president, withdrew.

Mobilisation of voters by a range of civil society groups and political parties was influential in the 2004 Indian election. Turnout was 56 per cent, defying predictions of significant voter decline. As Hilary Wainwright points out in Chapter 5, global civil society played a role, albeit an indirect one. The Fourth World Social Forum, held in Mumbai in 2004, brought formal parties on the left together with civil society groups and social movements, including Dalit organisations. Parties on the left went on to play an influential role in the May 2004 elections, campaigning against communalism and convincing a diverse range of parties of the need for a secular government. The Congress Party’s surprise victory would have been impossible without strategic alliances with various political parties and a groundswell of support from those marginalised and alienated by the BJP’s policies (Chandrasekhar, 2004). The BJP’s ‘India Shining’ campaign backfired badly; for the rural poor, farmers and people of low caste and class it served as a painful reminder of how the government’s economic policies had failed them. Their reaction to this ill thought-out campaign and the BJP’s perceived support for the massacre of Muslims at Gujarat heralded the unexpected victory of the Congress Party.

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forces, including Muslims and people of low caste and class, rejected the Bharatiya Janata Party's neo-liberal economic policies and voted in the Congress Party. The war in Iraq also influenced election behaviour, with civil society groups organising to oppose pro-war governments in Spain, Italy, the UK and the US.

What this experience suggests is a recasting of national democracy. Sovereignty is not being eroded so much as transformed. Civil society is beginning to understand that the framework of global governance is composed of states and that who is elected matters at a global level. On the other hand, it is also learning how to make use of global networks to enhance democracy at the national level. Table 1.5 based on our Records section presents data for a purposive sample of high-, medium- and low-ranking countries on a World Bank measure of voice and accountability. Taking this as a rough measure of democracy, it is clear from the table that this is positively linked to globalisation, measured in terms of Internet usage and air travel, and to global civil society if a surrogate measure of membership of INGOs is used. The linear correlation between the World Bank's ranking of voice and accountability and Internet use per 100,000 population is 0.84 at the country level, and 0.56 for the relationship between Internet use and membership in INGOs. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the positive relationship between these indicators graphically.

### Local democracy

Many democracy theorists argue that an important way to reinvigorate democracy is greater devolution to the local level. Nation states are centralising institutions and increased public participation can best be achieved at a local level. While it is true that many decisions are now taken at the global level, it is also the case that the increased complexity of decision-making allows for greater 'subsidiarity', that is to say, allowing as many decisions as possible to be taken at the level closest to the citizen. Membership of the European Union has allowed regions like Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia to pursue fairly autonomous policies within a framework that allows sovereignty and national self-determination to operate as more fluid, less all-or-nothing concepts.

In Chapter 5, Hilary Wainwright asks whether global civil society enhances or undermines democracy at a local level. As at the national level, the conclusion is double. On the one hand, many local civil society groups that have been able to improve the substantive democratic conditions of local government through global links: ranging from parts of China where global links provided activists with a higher profile, allowing them

to open public debates that would otherwise have remained closed, to the successful export of the 'participatory budget' model from Porto Alegre to 18 other countries, partly through the mediation of the World Social Forum. Other municipalities have been able to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis national governments and to respond to the needs of their citizens through global links – fair trade arrangements, twinings, appeals to global public pressure, direct relations to donors. On the other hand, the influx of INGOs and the conditions attached to aid may seduce local civil society groups into prioritising donor concerns above local needs, or they may smother local initiatives.

### Democracy at a global level?

We share Anderson and Rieff's scepticism about a world parliament and about the possibility of procedural democracy at a global level. But we disagree with Anderson and Rieff's implicit assumption that the clock can be turned back, that civil society can become national again and the simple world of national sovereignty and democracy at the national level restored. Herein lies the case for global civil society. If key decisions are taken at the global level, there have to be mechanisms for increasing the responsiveness of global institutions to the demands of individual citizens. Procedural democracy at the global level could not achieve that because the world is too complex to be represented by a world parliament. Dialogue and deliberation, which are in principle open to all civil society groups and which take place at many levels, are the next best option. Global civil society is not representative. It is not the same as democracy. But it could be considered what has been called a 'functional equivalent' (Rosenau, 1998: 40–1) or an 'alternative mechanism' (Scholte, 2001: 15) for democratising global governance. Moreover, if global civil society was to be combined with subsidiarity – more decision-making at a local level – it could enhance the participatory role of the individual citizen.

The problem with Anderson and Rieff is that they are nostalgic for an era of national simplicities. It is a world that no longer exists, probably for the better. The price that was paid for national sovereignty was the existence of repressive undemocratic governments. The erosion of democracy at the national level has meant the erosion of authoritarianism at the national level too. The choice, as in Iraq, for post-authoritarian states is between democracy and failure, that is to say, lawlessness, lack of legitimacy and pervasive violence. It may be that it is only through global links that democracy can be strengthened at the national level, albeit imperfectly.

Thus, the issue now is, how to choose national representatives at the global level through elections and how to maximise the possibilities for individuals to debate and influence significant decisions through a combination of subsidiarity and dialogue.

What the past year has exposed is the way that global debates can be domesticated and domestic debates globalised. To the extent that democracy is recast as a contribution to global debate and deliberation, there are real possibilities for constructing an effective framework for global governance, for closing the gap between the green zone and the red zone. To the extent that civil society remains wedded to old-fashioned notions of sovereignty, the end result may not be democracy but continuing insecurity; terrorism rather than global civil society may be crossing the red-green divide.

If key decisions are taken at the global level, there have to be mechanisms for increasing the responsiveness of global institutions to the demands of individual citizens

### Conclusion

The war in Iraq may turn out to be one of those moments that change the way people perceive power and the politics of power. Global civil society, in all its political and cultural variety and manifestations, has a central role to play in influencing those perceptions. The Bush administration, supposedly the most powerful actor in the world, believed that it could impose democracy on Iraq through military power and that the example of Iraq would help to topple authoritarian regimes in the region as a whole. Although many Iraqis were initially grateful for their liberation, the US rapidly lost Iraqi goodwill through its arbitrary and excessive use of military power. Military power became the primary obstacle rather than the means to achieve the administration's objective.

Moreover, the unilateral use of power contributed to the gap between the green and the red zones; it exacerbated 'global rancour'. Global terror, far from abating, has increased in 2003/4 with incidents in Casablanca, Istanbul, Riyadh, and Madrid. And in the Middle East, the continuing violence in Palestine and the attacks on locals

and Westerners in Saudi Arabia suggest that the war has brought, not democracy, but even more insecurity.

All the same, Europe and Africa do seem to be making further strides in building multilateralist structures. The EU has finally achieved its enlargement from 15 to 25 states, although its constitution will still be subject to national referendums, and the rise of anti-Europe parties may slow down further integration. Two important new organs of the African Union, the Peace and Security Council and the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, have come into force in 2004. The former is actively involved in trying to resolve the Darfur crisis in Sudan. At the time of writing, it has sent military observers and alluded to the possibility of military intervention under a United Nations mandate.

The question is, which of these developments will turn out to have been more important in the long run. While the limitations of unilateralist military power are making themselves felt, the power of multilateralist institutions to resolve crises is by no means indisputable. The failure to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is the most vivid reminder, but the weakness of their response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic is no less dramatic.

In the 2001 and 2003 Yearbooks, we described four possible scenarios: unilateralist, bargain, division and utopian (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001; Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius, 2003). The two extremes, unilateralist and utopian, continue to be the most relevant. The nightmare scenario is one in which Iraq becomes the theatre of the conflict between Global America and Global Islam, violence spreads throughout the Islamic world (compounded by tribal ethnic and religious cleavages that are exploited by the entrepreneurs of violence), and terror rather than global debate enters the domestic arena in many Western countries. In such a situation, the result could also be a strengthening of extremists in the West, and a test of global civil society, perhaps beyond its limits, for the reasons we outlined above.

There is, of course, a more positive scenario. This is one in which the United States and its coalition partners come to recognise that democracy in Iraq, stability in the Middle East, and security for their own citizens can be achieved only through a return to multilateralism and through an intensive dialogue with global and local civil society. In this scenario, the US joins the UN, the EU and the African Union in finding solutions for Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine by supporting civil society and dealing with human rights violations through international law. At the time of writing, there are some signs of a shift towards such a scenario. The UN Special Representative, Lakshmi Brahimi, did engage



Table I.5: Democracy, globalisation and global civil society

Country	Voice and accountability 2002	Air transport* 2001	Membership of INGOs per million population 2003	www users per 1000 population 2002
Korea, Dem. Rep.	0.0	0.00	12.2	-
Iraq	0.5		22.0	1.0
Eritrea	1.0		42.3	2.3
Myanmar	1.5	0.01	10.1	0.5
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2.0	0.00	15.8	0.9
Turkmenistan	2.5	0.31	34.8	1.7
Cuba	3.0	0.08	97.6	10.7
Laos	3.5	0.04	47.3	2.7
Sudan	4.0	0.01	20.0	2.6
Libya	4.5	0.11	87.7	22.5
Sri Lanka	48.0	0.09	69.2	10.6
Fiji	48.5	0.73	769.5	61.0
Madagascar	49.0	0.04	42.5	3.5
Albania	49.5	0.04	242.6	3.9
Bolivia	50.0	0.19	144.0	32.4
Ghana	50.5	0.02	61.7	7.8
Benin	51.0	0.01	105.6	7.4
El Salvador	51.5	0.27	139.4	46.5
Nicaragua	52.0	0.01	160.2	16.8
Germany	95.5	0.69	80.8	411.9
Iceland	96.5	4.89	6,353.3	647.9
New Zealand	97.0	2.97	685.5	484.4
Switzerland	97.5	2.31	727.7	351.0
Netherlands	98.0	1.25	372.5	506.3
Norway	98.5	3.22	987.3	502.6
Sweden	99.0	1.47	604.5	573.1
Finland	99.5	1.29	911.4	508.9
Denmark	100.0	1.19	932.1	512.8

\*number of passengers carried, per capita



Figure 1.2: Democracy, globalisation and global civil society




Figure 1.2 shows the results of a multidimensional scaling analysis, which aims to depict the similarities and differences between the countries in Table 1.5 on their values for measures of democracy, globalisation and global civil society (for technical details please see the glossary). The three clusters of countries reflect the purposive sampling used, so that we can identify high-, mid- and low-scoring countries on voice and accountability as we move from left to right hand side. An interesting feature of the plot is that the inclusion of three other indicators in the analysis does not reduce this clustering effect to any great degree: that is, the rankings for voice and accountability are reflected in similar patterns for the other variables. This demonstrates the positive associations between the indicators. However, the plot adds a little more detail to our understanding of the nature of the patterns among these measures.

The group of seven countries on the far right hand side of the plot (Turkmenistan, Cuba, Libya, Myanmar, Laos, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan) are very tightly clustered: they tend to have very similar and relatively low values on all four indicators. The eight countries in the middle of the plot (Fiji, El Salvador, Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Albania, Nicaragua, Madagascar, Benin and Ghana) tend to have slightly higher but also very similar scores on all four variables. Fiji is the exception, being set apart a little due to its unusually high rate of INGO membership per million of the population. Whilst a very useful indicator, INGO membership needs to be interpreted with some caution with respect to population size, since the per capita measure is often very large for countries with small populations. A similar effect is seen for Iceland, which is set apart from the other high-scoring countries because of its very high rate of INGO membership. The eight other countries (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, New Zealand and Norway), with high values on each of the four indicators, are markedly less tightly clustered than the other two groups. This is due to the fact that, relative to the countries in the other two groups, they cover a broader range of scores on the indicators for air transport, INGO membership and Internet use. The order in which they appear on the vertical axis reflects most strongly their rankings on air transport (with increasing scores as one moves from the top downwards).

in wide-ranging consultations inside Iraq, and the latest (at the time of writing) Security Council resolution does give the United Nations a key role in constraining the behaviour of American troops. The international community's response to Darfur will provide another key test of the viability of the 'utopian scenario'. This scenario would require global civil society to shed the anti-Americanism of some of its proponents and to engage both the US and the Islamic world on equally critical but constructive grounds.

In these senses, global civil society cannot be, and has not been, a helpless bystander at this crossroads. Our chronology of global civil society events shows that, after the war began, the protests and demonstrations

about Iraq died down; but a continuation can be observed of what have become bread-and-butter global meetings, testifying to the continuing vitality of the underlying global process of debate and deliberation. This has been accompanied by the return to domestic politics in order to influence governmental behaviour at the global level; the most dramatic example of this was perhaps the Spanish elections of 2004. Global civil society is the mobilisation of global public opinion. Therefore, the debates and positions within global civil society can affect the framework of global governance and cross the red-green divide in a positive direction, both directly at the global level and in the way it is beginning to recast domestic politics.

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