



PART
2

ISSUES IN
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY



CHAPTER 4

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: OIL AND ACTIVISM

Yahia Said

Ngalba, Chad: As night fell and the bright lights of the brand new oil field wrapped this hamlet in their golden glow, Neurmbaye Elie, a local farmer, pointed across the field before him. There, Mr. Elie said, just left of the blazing gas flare, under the streetlight, once stood the village initiation site. Animals were sacrificed there, spirits were supplicated, and the village boys became men. Then it became part of the oil complex, fenced in, a patch of earth not unlike the rest; the village got about \$130 for it. Now, he worries. What if the spirits, displeased, sprang from that sacred ground and spread willy-nilly across the land? (Sengupta, 2004)

Oil's promise of fabulous riches has an irresistible lure for governments, corporations and ordinary people. They should know better, as oil fortunes are usually laced with a heavy dose of misery. Opulent Parisian boulevards in early twentieth-century Baku, universal health and education in 1970s Iraq, and lush golf courses in the desert emirate of Dubai are matched by oil-fuelled killing fields in Chechnya and Angola and the ominously melting polar ice caps. These contradictions have made oil the focus of confrontations between governments, companies and activists. Front lines, real and imaginary, run across every oilfield and pipeline from Aceh to Alaska.

Oil has two characteristics that make it of particular interest from a global civil society perspective. First, oil is a global commodity in as much as it has been traded on the global market for decades. Both exporters and importers of oil have experienced the forces of globalisation, from interdependence to loss of sovereignty, before it became a pervasive phenomenon. Second, oil brings together concerns as diverse as war and human rights, development and environmental sustainability, governance and corporate responsibility. Therefore, oil campaigns involve the building of cross-border and cross-disciplinary activist networks and alliances.

This chapter first considers the character of oil as a global commodity, then looks at the groups, networks, and individuals engaged in this debate with the aim of identifying the main arguments. Finally, it examines the relationship between these arguments and our positions on globalisation (Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius, 2003).

Oil as a global commodity

Oil has certain unique characteristics that have profound implications for development, human rights, conflict and the environment – some of the main areas of civil society contestation.

Oil is still the most important source of energy, and the demand for oil increases more or less in line with global economic growth. Although advanced 'post-industrial' economies have improved energy conservation and are also investing in alternative energy sources, countries like China and India, which are catching up, are becoming increasingly dependent on oil.

The supply of oil depends on natural endowment and not on the productivity of labour. Hence, the income accruing to the suppliers of oil takes the form of rent rather than profits and wages. As a form of income, rent depends on ownership or control of a natural resource, in particular the territory where the oil is located, rather than on ownership or control of capital and labour.

Oil is a finite resource. Although predictions of global shortage have been persistently exaggerated over time (see Box 4.1), sources of oil have become increasingly difficult to extract, either for technical reasons (deep-sea drilling) or for social reasons, as many oil reserves are based in regions of instability – the 'social equivalent of deep-sea drilling', according to one oil executive.

Oil is a capital-intensive commodity requiring large, fixed long-term investments. Capital requirements grow as oil is tapped in increasingly remote areas and transported over longer distances. This, combined with the commodity's geostrategic legacy, has left its mark

Box 4.1: Twin peaks: Hubbert's Peak vs the Resource Pyramid

The scenario described above is a variation of Hubbert's Peak, named after M King Hubbert, the American geophysicist who worked for Shell and the US Geological Survey. In 1956, Hubbert predicted that global oil output would peak around 1995 and thereafter gradually decline. As with most Malthusian prophecies, the cataclysmic oil shortage seems to be always just around the corner. By Hubbert's reckoning we should now be in the midst of an oil crisis. His proponents continue to shift the crisis point forward every couple of years.

Moving Hubbert's Peak

Conventional oil (billions of barrels)	1989	1990	1992	1993	1995	1996	1997	1999
Produced	600	628	697	718	761	784	785	820
Reserves	725	806	725	722	800	836	823	827
Discovered	1,325	1,434	1,422	1,440	1,561	1,620	1,618	1,647
Yet to find	250	216	228	210	189	180	182	153
Yet to produce	975	1,022	953	932	989	1,016	1,005	980
Ultimate	1,575	1,650	1,650	1,650	1,750	1,800	1,800	1,800
Annual depletion rate (%)	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.2
Depletion mid-point (year)		1998	1998	1998	2000	2001	2001	2003

Source: The Coming Global Oil Crisis (URL)

Opponents of Hubbert's Peak employ the Resource Pyramid theory (Ahlbrandt and McCabe, 2002). According to this approach, the amount of available oil reserves is not fixed but varies according to economic, political and technology parameters at any given historical moment. At the top of the pyramid are high-quality resources that are easy to extract. As one moves towards the bottom, resources become harder and more expensive to extract and transport. The reserve estimate depends on the 'assessment slice', a point across the pyramid that depends on the point of economic feasibility. At any point in time, the slice divides the pyramid into the part of oil reserves that are economically feasible to develop (above the slice) and those that are out of reach. As technology improves and access to remote regions becomes easier, the slice can move down the pyramid, thus enlarging the amount of available resources. Opponents of Hubbert's Peak do not deny that one day oil resources will dry up, but they expect the peak to occur at a much later date and the decline to be more gradual (Yergin, 2004).



on the corporations involved in oil exploration and development. Oil production is concentrated in a handful of vertically integrated multinationals with vast resources. Their highly paid engineers, managers and lawyers pride themselves on being able to keep oil flowing under any circumstances. Executives are used to manipulating small governments and communities, just as they are comfortable working hand in glove with their domicile governments, the classic example being

the role played by oil companies in helping the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlawi, topple the Musaddaq government in Iran in 1949, at the behest of Western powers (Yergin, 1991).

At every stage of the process – production (disturbance of natural habitats), transportation (oil spills) and use (release of carbon dioxide and other pollutants) – oil has serious environmental consequences.

While civil society contestations in areas where oil



has a direct impact are relatively straightforward, there is significant disagreement over its indirect impact, what has been called the 'oil curse'. This refers to the paradoxical failure of oil-rich countries to translate their comparative advantage into better economic and social performance than their less well-endowed peers. Far from it: they seem to be prone to underdevelopment, predatory government, state collapse and war.

A majority of analysts perceive a correlation, both anecdotal and empirical, between resource dependence, underdevelopment and social and political instability (Auty, 1990; Gelb, 1988; Karl, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997). The debate over the oil curse is a subset of the broader resource curse debate. It traces its roots all the way back to the Greek legend of King Midas, whose ability to turn everything he touched to gold brought him nothing but misery and ruin. Medieval thinkers blamed easy riches for human sloth and Adam Smith warned of 'the income of men who love to reap where they never sowed' (Smith, 1776/1937: 399).

One version of the resource curse argument is the 'Dutch disease'. This is the argument that increasing oil

dependence leads to appreciation of the currency and decline in competitiveness of other more labour-intensive sectors, both manufacturing and agricultural. Often oil-dependent governments invest in new industrial sectors that turn out to be unsustainable. When the oil price falls or when resources are depleted, such economies face severe problems. The 1980s debt crises started with oil-dependent countries before rippling through the rest of the Third World. It was triggered by a crash in oil prices. Of course, the economic and development literature offers many policy prescriptions for the adverse economic consequences of oil export dependence and for preparing an alternative development base for when oil runs out. Yet most oil-producing nations – the big exception is Norway – seem to have failed to live up to these challenges.

This gives rise to a second version of the oil curse argument: the predatory state. This argument builds on the Weberian notion that states are shaped by their main source of income (Weber, 1914/1979). In democratic societies, taxation is the main source of state revenue and rulers depend on public consent. Citizens recognise the necessity of paying taxes by accepting the state's legitimacy and the benefits derived from government expenditures. In the former Communist states, taxation was also important as a source of revenue; compliance was achieved through a mixture of ideology and repression. An oil-dependent state is one in which the primary source of revenue is oil rents. Typically, rentier states are predatory. They do not need to bargain with their citizens because they do not depend on their citizens for taxation. They merely need to remain in power, which they do through a mixture of patronage and repression. They create loyal networks of support through patronage and they combine this with repression. A position in government is an opportunity for rent-seeking rather than for public service. Hence, oil states are too dependent on this predatory behaviour to be able to break the cycle of oil dependence and, at the same time, they have sufficient resources to carry out coercive functions.

Nowadays, however, rentier states are often failing states. It is much more difficult to retain control through coercion because of globalisation. Even in the most closed authoritarian states, dissidents can gain access to the outside world through the Internet. The spread of small arms and organised crime also means that without democratic legitimacy, it is much more difficult for a state to maintain a monopoly of organised violence, and thus to control territory through purely military means. Even rich oil countries like Saudi Arabia have become sites of instability and low-level violence. Thus, if the Dutch

disease argument explains continued poverty and underdevelopment, the predatory state argument explains why so many governments have failed to reverse Dutch disease and why oil states tend to violate human rights.

Yet a third argument has to do with the relationship between oil dependence and conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2001), analysing data on 1,167 conflicts between 1960 and 1990, find a strong correlation between dependence on primary commodity exports and the risk of conflict. Analysts disagree whether this correlation is causal in nature and through which avenues it occurs.

The most common explanation of the link between oil and conflict stresses oil's geostrategic importance. According to this argument, oil was and remains an essential ingredient of capitalism and superpower status. Without secure access to cheap oil, neither can survive. Secure access to oil means control over territory, and this can be achieved either directly through military conquest or indirectly through influence over oil states. There is ample historical evidence to support this argument. Daniel Yergin's popular monograph (1991), *The Prize*, interprets the entire history of the twentieth century as a quest for oil, with superpowers and corporations collaborating to secure profits and dominance. In both First and Second World Wars, control of oilfields shaped strategies on all sides. The geostrategic argument is quite popular among activists, many of whom extend it into the twenty-first century:

US control of oil and the guaranteeing of access to it was the cause of the Gulf War in 1991, and is also the cause of an imminent war against Iraq, since the world's most important oil reserves lie in that region. Access to this resource led to the intervention in Afghanistan, an important gas pipeline route that connects the Caspian region with Europe. Similarly, the objective of the war declared in Colombia is the control of oil production in that country and also improving its presence in the region. Specifically, to avoid losing control over the crude oil coming primarily from Venezuela. Plan Puebla Panama and the 'New Horizons' military initiative include the construction of pipelines directed toward the United States. (Oilwatch, 2003)

This argument is reinforced by the rhetoric emanating from Washington on the need to secure oil supplies as a matter of national security and by the incestuous relationship between the Bush administration and several energy companies.

Opponents of the geopolitical narrative argue that, rather than dictating US policy, concerns over energy security are being used as pretext for geopolitics. If Iraqi oil were to come on stream fully as a result of US involvement in that country, it could depress oil prices to the point of making oil in Russia, the Caspian, West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico economically less viable, thus devaluing billions of dollars of investments in these regions and hurting most multinational oil companies. It would also weaken the argument for opening the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge and the Rockies to oil exploration, one of the main planks of US Vice-President Dick Cheney's energy policy (Cable, 2003). The lower oil prices would also eat into the revenues that US oil corporations could hypothetically gain from controlling Iraqi oil resources. It is not even a given that US oil companies could emerge as the main 'owners' of Iraqi oil wealth. They would have to compete with the new Iraqi government as well as other multinationals. An analysis of the benefits to the US from controlling Iraq's oil resources should take into consideration the total cost to the US, including the war. Table 4.1 provides a hypothetical analysis of the war in Iraq as an investment aimed at controlling Iraqi oil wealth. It shows that US-Iraq Oil Inc would be a loss-making enterprise.

Likewise, it is argued that the jockeying over Caspian oil and export routes is not about safeguarding access to oil from Russia and Iran but using oil to marginalise them politically. In an informal conversation, an oil executive complained about the Clinton administration's efforts to promote the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the pressure it was exerting on oil companies. He accused the administration of trying to compel oil companies to finance its foreign policy.

Even if the premise is accepted that oil is essential for the functioning of capitalism, it is not at all clear that the traditional geostrategic approach is the best way to secure oil supplies. Given that it is much more difficult to control territory through military means, geopolitical approaches can compound the instability that is increasingly typical of predatory states, tipping the balance towards state collapse. The war in Iraq, the associated collapse of the Iraqi state and the ongoing insurgency have, at least for the time being, reduced the security of supply coming from that country. The insurgency, which is attracting Islamic terrorists from all over the world, has created an added threat to oil supplies from Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole. This is reflected in the current surge in oil prices, which have at times reached record highs.

There is plenty of evidence to show that oil fuels war economies in many regions. Oil revenues are tapped to sustain conflict either directly, as by the Angolan or Sudanese governments, or indirectly through extortion of oil companies and workers, kidnapping and checkpoints as by the Russian Army and the rebels in Chechnya, the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) leftist guerrilla group, and the secessionist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia. Indeed, the role of oil in many of today's conflicts is more direct in this respect, and even small reserves are sufficient to fuel brutal conflicts for many years.

Authoritarianism and war in oil-dependent countries is a combined product of oil dependence and geopolitics. In the past, this combination was compatible with ensuring secure oil supplies for the developed world, profits for multinational oil companies and even some modicum of development in oil-dependent economies. Today, it is no longer possible to combine these competing demands. With globalisation the main result of oil dependence and geopolitics seems to be state collapse, which is not only a threat to oil supplies but a source of global insecurity.

Table 4.1: The war in Iraq as an investment in controlling Iraqi oil wealth

US\$ millions, unless stated otherwise

1) Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	...2027
2) Daily export (millions of barrels)	0.5	1.5	2	3	4	4	5	5	6	6
3) Price (\$ per barrel)	30	35	35	33	33	30	30	28	28	28
4) Revenue (2x3x360)	5,400	18,900	25,200	35,640	47,520	43,200	54,000	50,400	60,480	60,480
5) Iraq's share	5,400	18,900	25,200	30,000	35,940	35,400	40,800	40,080	45,120	45,120
6) US share (4 minus 5)	-	-	-	5,640	11,580	7,800	13,200	10,320	15,360	15,360
7) US outlays	70,000	70,000	35,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000		
8) Net US revenue (6 minus 7)	-70,000	-70,000	-35,000	-4,360	1,580	-2,200	3,200	320	15,360	15,360
9) Discount rate	5.5%									
10) Net present value	-\$51,808									

Assumptions:

- 1 25 years typical investment horizon for oil projects
- 2 Projected ramp-up to six million barrels per day – the most optimistic forecast
- 3 Prices to ease gradually from current levels to \$28 per barrel after Iraqi ramp-up – an optimistic assumption given likely impact of additional Iraqi oil on prices, as well as expected additional output from other regions
- 5 Based on Iraqi government budget until 2006 (CPA, URL) then assuming that the US will keep 50 per cent of new oil revenue – optimistic since national governments customarily keep up to 88 per cent (Yergin, 2002)
- 7 Outlays: 2003 and 2004 based on additional congressional appropriations for war (Cost of War, URL); 2005 assuming half that level. Investment in oil infrastructure of \$50 billion. Estimates range from \$20 billion (Yergin, 2002) to \$100 (Heritage, URL) of investments necessary to ramp-up production to six million barrels per day over five years. This assumes no US troops in Iraq after 2005.
- 9 US government cost of borrowing based on 20-year US Treasury bond – a conservative assumption for a project with such high risks, including the possibility of lower output, political unrest, nationalisation and lower oil prices
- 10 In reality, the net present value would be even lower since the above calculation is based on revenue rather than net income. It does not account for extraction and transportation costs.

Campaigns and groups

The oil curse framework has significant implications for activists who contributed to its development by highlighting the interconnectedness of the various consequences of oil dependence. The framework has inspired the creation of integrated campaigns that unite peace, human rights, environmental and social justice activists. This has not always been the case. Traditionally, and up until the 1980s, anti-colonial Southern activists and their Northern supporters from the left campaigned for the establishment of national sovereignty over oil resources, as opposed to Western control via the multinationals. At times, this brought them into conflict both with environmental activists, who opposed oil development regardless of who controlled it, and with human rights campaigners, who saw no reason to trust nationalist leaders any more than the client regimes they opposed.

The oil curse framework clarifies the relationship between the various campaign targets: Western powers, multinational corporations, predatory Southern governments, oil dependence and oil itself. The struggle of the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta since 1993 represented a watershed in this context. There, Southern activists confronted both a predatory national government and the oil multinationals, with the full support of a broad spectrum of international groups (see Box 4.2).

Many activists use the oil curse as an argument for opposing any form of oil development since, by its nature, the industry is a harbinger not only of environmental degradation but also of social injustice, political oppression and war. Environmental groups espousing such positions are the most visible campaigners on oil issues today. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature feature prominently in global networks and campaigns surrounding, for example, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review. They are also active in regional campaigns that target specific oil and gas projects, from Alaska to Chad and from Azerbaijan to Ecuador. Often such regional campaigns have been the springboard for INGOS to expand their campaigning in order to encompass issues of indigenous people's rights, human rights, development and corporate responsibility. For example, Greenpeace played a leading role in the international solidarity campaign in support of the Ogoni people (see Box 4.2). Friends of the Earth is working with the Kurdish Human Rights project in the campaign against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (see Box 4.3).

© MARTIN ADLER/PANOS PICTURES



Fuelled by oil: Indonesian GAM fighters

There is insufficient space in this chapter to enumerate the environmental aspects of oil development and consumption. In general, the environmental impact of oil can be separated into two broad categories: environmental and biodiversity issues, which are associated with oil and other industrial activities; and climate change, which is associated specifically with the consumption of fossil fuels. While it is possible to reduce the impact on biodiversity through diligence and technological innovation, climate change is an inherent consequence of using oil and other fossil fuels. It can be avoided only by switching to other, more sustainable sources of energy. Over the past decade, climate change has become the central issue for environmental activism on oil (see Box 4.4).

The protection of indigenous people's rights provides a bridge between environmental and human rights issues. This combination has been the model for many regional oil campaigns since the Niger Delta campaign, in which the protection of the Ogoni People and their habitat against abuse by Shell and the Nigerian government was the central issue (see Box 4.2). International environmental groups are often criticised for being oblivious to Southern needs, especially in the social and economic spheres. By supporting local indigenous groups, environmental campaigns acquire both a human face and a local constituency which helps them pre-empt such attacks. Human rights activists and other groups can acquire broader appeal and appear less controversial by espousing indigenous rights issues. Indigenous people's issues are therefore some of the most prominent in campaigns against oil development. Groups in the Amazon basin

Box 4.2: Shell in Nigeria

By the time I finish, Nigeria is going to be ashamed standing before the council of the world. (Ibeanu, 1999: 21)

Nigeria provides one of the most tragic examples of the oil curse. Since the beginning of large scale commercial development in the 1950s, tens of billions of dollars from oil exports have translated into a net deterioration in the economy, human development and the environment throughout the country. From the end of the 1967–70 civil war, Shell, the largest oil producer in Nigeria, was closely associated with the military dictatorships that ruled the country until 1998. Both share the responsibility for Nigeria's plight. Nowhere is this more manifest than in the Niger Delta, Nigeria's main oil-producing region. Here, the equally fragile ecosystem and indigenous population have been severely damaged by decades of reckless exploration and production, economic mismanagement and political oppression.



© JACOB SILBERBERG/PANOS PICTURES

In 1993, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was established, making environmental as well as emancipatory demands. Its peaceful campaign was met with brutal repression, culminating in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders in 1995. The struggle of the Ogoni people – one of the smaller indigenous groups inhabiting the Delta – had major repercussions throughout Nigeria. It also inspired the anti-capitalist movement worldwide. Activists in Global Exchange and the Ruckus Society, who went on to lead riots in Seattle and Prague, started out campaigning with and for Ken Saro-Wiwa and his followers. Leveraging support from global civil society was integral to Ogoni strategy. Its appeal to activists worldwide lay in its holistic approach, which linked environmental demands with the struggle for indigenous rights, social justice and human rights. Ogoni activists succeeded in 'globalising' their struggle by holding the multinational corporations to account alongside the military dictatorship, and linking local demands with global issues of the environment and corporate responsibility. Their success inspired indigenous rights movements and local activists elsewhere, most notably the Zapatistas in Mexico.

I and my colleagues are not the only ones on trial. Shell is here on trial and it is as well that it is represented by counsel said to be holding a watching brief. The Company has, indeed, ducked this particular trial, but its day will surely come and the lessons learnt here may prove useful to it for there is no doubt in my mind that the ecological war that the Company has waged in the Delta will be called to question sooner than later and the crimes of that war be duly punished. The crime of the Company's dirty wars against the Ogoni people will also be punished. (Saro-Wiwa, 1995)

Shell was caught completely off guard by the global resonance of the Ogoni movement and attacks on its installations. As a result, it was forced to suspend oil production in Ogoniland in 1993. Shell had to move quickly from tacit support of the dictatorship to public relations damage control, before fully reassessing its policies in countries of operations and its relationships with host communities. In 1997, the company published its *Statement of General Business Principles* (Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, 1997), which – a first for a multinational – referred to human rights. Its subsidiary in the Niger Delta began publishing annual People and the Environment reports, organising stakeholder meetings, replacing community outreach with a broader development programme, and reviewing its environmental assessment procedures. This raised the bar for corporate social responsibility across the sector.

Box 4.3: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Campaign

There is a construction project being planned involving UK multinationals which is condemned by Amnesty International and 78 environmental and human rights groups around the world. If it goes ahead, the project will hasten global warming, destroy democracy, increase corporate power, stifle dissent, cause human rights abuses and create refugees. (Thomas, 2003)

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Campaign is a coalition of environmental and human rights groups opposed to the construction of a 1,000-mile pipeline to transport a million barrels of Caspian oil a day from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, via Tbilisi, Georgia.

The campaign works through public education and advocacy in the UK, the EU and the pipeline countries. It issues regular press releases and organises lectures, round tables and protests. It lobbies parliamentarians, government officials, and private and public lenders. A major thrust of the campaign is to block public funding for the pipeline by bilateral and multilateral organisations. It is also challenging the legality of the pipeline and the governing agreements in Turkey, the UK and the EU. The coalition, which comprises several groups from the region through which the pipeline will pass, is dominated by three British groups: the Kurdish Human Rights Project, Corner House and Friends of the Earth.

There is hardly any aspect of the pipeline that the campaign does not attack. Activists argue that, when completed, the pipeline will contribute to the release of greenhouse gases equivalent to the output of all UK power stations, and will threaten marine life at the port of Ceyhan and precious mineral water sources in Georgia. The risk of environmental damage is exacerbated by the route of the pipeline, which runs through an earthquake zone in Turkey. Economically, the campaign prophesies that the pipeline will cause increased dependence on oil exports in the countries it passes through, without meeting their development and poverty reduction needs. Moreover, it will cause loss of property and livelihoods for people living along its route. Politically, the pipeline passes through a fragile region rife with geopolitical and ethnic tensions, frozen and active conflicts, and human and minority rights violations. Campaigners say the pipeline will exacerbate all of these. The BTC pipeline is also attacked as another example of how an alliance of multinational oil corporations, superpowers and international finance can infringe sovereignty and self-determination in the South. The campaign singles out Host Country Agreements, which are designed to protect BP and other members of the consortium against confiscation and unfavourable legislation after the project has begun, as a violation of sovereignty, the constitution and international norms.

Proponents of the pipeline have tried to address some of these concerns, with varying degrees of success. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) were conducted in the route countries and consultation held with the various stakeholders. The consortium has also planned various projects throughout the life of the pipeline under a Community Investment Programme. The campaigners question the rigour of ESIs and the validity of some of the community consultations. The BTC Campaign alleges that some of the consortium's consultations in Kurdish villages in Turkey never actually took place (BTC Campaign, 2003). It also questions the efficacy and sustainability of the proposed community investment programme if the same top-down approach as in the rest of the project is adopted.

One of the most persistent criticisms of the pipeline is that it was borne out of geopolitical rather than economic considerations. For many observers, BTC is also known as the 'no Russia, no Iran pipeline'. The US has made the BTC pipeline a major plank of its foreign policy. The administration hopes the pipeline will help contain Iran, strengthen Turkey and limit what it views as Russian encroachments on the newly independent 'democracies' of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Turkey is going along with the project in the hope of carving out its own sphere of influence in the region. By supporting the Western pipeline route, Azerbaijan and Georgia hope to secure the support of US and Turkey in the face of external threats (from Russia, Iran and Armenia, for example) and against domestic enemies. They are forging ahead with attempts to strengthen their ties to the West including, for example, Azerbaijan's recent bid to join NATO. Predictably, this has drawn the ire of both Russia and Iran.

The results of this 'Great Game' have so far been a net loss to everyone involved. Geopolitical considerations have become an obstacle to finding the most economically viable option for the development of the region's oil resources. The wrangling has marked a new low in US-Russian relations and, as such, has resuscitated Cold Warriors

Box 4.3: continued

on both sides. It is endangering the fragile détente between Iran and the West, and weakening supporters of the latter within the Islamic republic. The geopolitical rivalry has maintained and sometimes intensified the region's myriad conflicts. Finally, the Azeri government is exploiting regional and global power rivalries to strengthen its hold on power at home. It hopes that an alliance with the West will let it get away with undemocratic practices and human rights violations.

Apart from the geopolitics, it is difficult to accept the outright condemnation of the BTC campaign. Activists' demands that the pipeline should not proceed unless it eliminates poverty, solves conflict, improves governance and ends human rights violations sound a lot like rent-seeking – the greedy scramble for oil riches that is ignited whenever new oil is discovered. The BTC Campaign did not succeed in preventing the construction of the pipeline, which is currently under way. By keeping the spotlight on the parties involved, it may succeed in mitigating some of its worst repercussions.

involved in AmazonWatch and other networks have been successful in blocking oil and gas projects. A coalition involving AmazonWatch, Friends of the Earth, Bank Information Center, Environmental Defense, Amazon Alliance and the Institute for Policy Studies succeeded in dissuading the US Export Import Bank from providing funding for a the controversial Camisea Project in Peru in 2003. In 2002, U'wa activists succeeded in forcing Occidental to shelve plans to explore for oil on their lands in Colombia (AmazonWatch, 2002).

Human rights activists have been pursuing violations committed either directly by the security services of oil multinationals or by paramilitary groups and national

security services acting on behalf of those companies. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among others, have campaigned against paramilitary violence and attacks on trade union activists in the oilfields of Colombia, where BP, Occidental and Talisman Energy, among other companies, are operating. Groups have also protested against widespread human rights violations by the Indonesian military in the oil-rich regions of Aceh and Kalamntan. In the case of Aceh, ExxonMobil was accused of providing logistical support to the military (Schultze, forthcoming).

Increasingly, human rights groups have been campaigning against oil and gas projects in zones of conflict



© SVEN TORENNIPANGOS PICTURES

Box 4.4: The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The history of the Kyoto Protocol brings together the entire spectrum of civil society positions on oil and energy. Rejectionist environmental groups succeeded in putting the issue on the public agenda, and continued to campaign until policy-makers were forced to take notice. The protocol was the result of collaboration between Reformers and Supporters. It combines regulatory intervention through a multilateral process, redistribution from rich to poor countries and cooperation between government, civil society and corporations on the one hand with the use of market mechanisms on the other. In the end, Kyoto was all but abandoned by the Rejectionists as too little, too late. Today, it is being blocked by Regressives in the US and Russia, who see it as a threat to their national interests.

The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which has been ratified by 188 states and has been in effect since 1994, recognises the problem of human-induced global warming and commits signatories to work towards the ultimate goal of reducing the production of the greenhouse gases that cause it. The convention is a framework for future action that recognises the different responsibilities of rich and poor countries but does not specify any concrete measures. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is meant to do just that. Most importantly, it sets a quantitative target for developed countries of a five per cent reduction by 2012 of the 1990 level of emissions. The protocol imposes no requirements on developing countries. The average reduction target is distributed among developed countries in various proportions. For example, the EU is expected to achieve a reduction of eight per cent, while Australia (which is refusing to sign the protocol) can increase emissions by eight per cent. The protocol commits developed non-transition countries to providing additional financial resources and technology transfers to developing countries in order to promote sustainable development.

It offers several market mechanisms to reduce emissions. Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), developed countries can offset emissions against absorption by, for example, planting new forests, or sinks. They can obtain credits for helping reduce emissions in other countries or for financing sustainable energy in developing countries that achieve better reductions than required by the protocol. They can sell emission credits to others ('carbon trading').

The Kyoto Protocol will come into force only if ratified by 55 countries, including developed nations that account for at least 55 per cent of total carbon dioxide emissions, as measured in 1990. This goal is not achievable if both Russia (17.4 per cent) and the US (36.1 per cent) continue to balk at ratifying it (UNFCCC, 2002).

A broad network of environmental and other groups campaigned for the adoption of the protocol and for strengthening its provisions. However, many groups, such as Greenpeace, have become disillusioned with the outcome. Far from making a total break with the economic model of the Industrial Revolution era, which is predicated on the use of fossil fuels, Kyoto only offers minor adjustments to the margins. The process itself was hijacked by a bureaucratic elite that is deficient in terms of both scientific rigour and democratic accountability (Lohman, 2001). The activists direct most of their scorn at the market mechanisms, which they argue provide loopholes to developed countries, assign them ownership over the world's climate and encourage other forms of environmental damage through the promotion of monocultures (Greenpeace, 1998).

One of the main bodies associated with the convention is, in essence, a 'transnational advocacy network', inappropriately named the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC, which comprises 3,000 scientists from around the world, has argued convincingly that climate change is induced by human activity. Thanks to the IPCC, and despite vociferous early denials, today most oil and automotive manufacturers, with the notable exception of ExxonMobil, accept the main premise of Kyoto.

Another set of civil society actors that has campaigned against Kyoto has had some success, not in winning over public opinion, but in scuppering the agreement at governmental level. The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was established in 1989 to 'coordinate business participation in the international policy debate on the issue of global climate change and global warming' (Global Climate Coalition, URLa). The campaign, spearheaded by ExxonMobil, was dedicated to undermining the science of global warming and the Kyoto Protocol by, among other things, lobbying the US government. The GCC claimed to represent over six million US companies. With the exception of ExxonMobil, most multinational oil companies left the GCC as the reputational costs of denying global warming soared. These included BP, Shell and Texaco. However, together with the American Petroleum

Box 4.4: continued

Institute and the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), the GCC played a vital role in shaping the US position on climate change. On its website, the GCC, which ceased its operations in 2002, proudly proclaims its mission accomplished:

The Global Climate Coalition has been deactivated. The industry voice on climate change has served its purpose by contributing to a new national approach to global warming. (Global Climate Coalition, URL)

Indeed, with the Bush administration, hardly any convincing was required. Parts of the administration used groups such as the GCC to promote their anti-Kyoto policy. The Stop Esso campaign, which comprised Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and People's Planet, argues that the White House encouraged the CEI to sue the US Environmental Protection Agency over the science of climate change (Stop Esso, URL).

and in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, such as Sudan and Burma. Global campaigning against Talisman Energy's work in Sudan, which activists argued was contributing to the country's civil war, was among the factors leading to the company's ultimate departure in 1999. The Presbyterian Church played a key role in these efforts. Arco and Texaco were forced by the US Campaign for Burma, and other activists, to abandon projects in the country.

One approach that has been employed with increasing efficiency is litigation in the US via the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789, which was originally designed to combat piracy. This Act grants jurisdiction to US Federal Courts over 'any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States' (Global Policy Forum, URL). Groups like Earthrights International, which combines human rights and environmental demands, and International Labour Rights Fund have used ATCA to file suits against Unocal in Burma, Shell and Chevron in Nigeria, Talisman Energy in Sudan, ExxonMobil in Indonesia and Texaco in Ecuador and Peru. The case against Unocal in Burma has proceeded furthest, with hearings pending both before Federal and California State Courts.

The Superior Court of California's decision makes the case against Unocal the first in U.S. history in which a corporation will stand trial for human rights abuses committed abroad. (Earthrights International, URL)

The case against Texaco in Ecuador was dismissed but has now been taken on by an Ecuadorian court.

Multinational oil companies have always been the main target of oil activists. The breakdown of the link between authoritarianism and stability and the explosion of cross-border activism in the 1990s has left the once unassailable oil multinationals more exposed than ever. BP in Columbia, Shell in Nigeria, ExxonMobil in Indonesia, Total in Angola and Unocal in Burma, to name a few, faced serious reputational problems as a result of their association with conflict, human rights violations, and environmental degradation. The reaction in the industry to this new vulnerability was diverse. Smaller, privately held or state-owned companies, as well as those with little downstream exposure, which could not be affected by consumer boycotts, were prepared to shrug it off as long as there were profits to be made. Larger, publicly held companies exposed to both investor and consumer actions, as well as the threat of litigation, responded in a variety of ways, from cosmetic public relations and community outreach to attempts at fundamentally rethinking the way oil companies do business and their relations to the various stakeholders and the environment. At this stage, it remains unclear whether this new awareness of their broader responsibilities is sustainable in the long term, or whether it is a passing fad, a reaction to outside pressure that will subside as soon as the pressure eases (Oliviero and Simmons, 2002). The diversity of responses to public pressure suggests that some companies are prepared to extract oil regardless of the consequences.

The need for a binding multilateral mechanism governing the oil industry and the rights and responsibilities of multinational oil companies seems obvious if tragedies like those of Nigeria are not to be repeated in the future. Yet most companies are reluctant to submit

Box 4.5: Multilateral initiatives

Over the past four years, a number of multilateral initiatives have addressed the role of oil and other extractive industries in underdevelopment, authoritarian rule and conflict. In most cases, these initiatives were a direct consequence of successful campaigning by INGOs and networks. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (US Department of State, 2000), signed in December 2000, was initiated by the US Department of State, the British Foreign Office and a number of multinationals domiciled in these two countries. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International participated in this initiative. But it was persistent campaigning by NGOs against human rights abuses, which they alleged were committed by security forces guarding oil installations, that led to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The document sets standards for security at oil installations, which are compatible with human rights. As such, these principles represent a minimalist approach, combining do-no-harm and voluntarism.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, URL) was launched by Britain at the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 with the aim of tackling one of the main sources of the oil curse: the lack of transparency about payments by oil companies to governments, and the misuse of these payments by governments. The initiative aims to address some of the shortcomings of previous arrangements by targeting all companies and by aiming to include mandatory measures. One example of such measures is to demand the disclosure of payments by corporations to governments as part of stock exchange listing procedures and other official filings.

The EITI is a direct consequence of the Publish What You Pay campaign, which was launched by Global Witness and international financier George Soros in 2002. Global Witness is a small London-based group that has taken a lead in investigating the misuse of natural resource revenues by corrupt governments and the role of these resources in fuelling conflict (Global Witness, 1999). Publish What You Pay (URL) calls 'for mandatory disclosure of payments to and transactions with governments by multinational natural resource companies, their subsidiaries and business partners'. It brings together 200 groups from across the globe.

The World Bank, stung by a myriad of campaigns targeting its extensive oil and gas portfolio, launched the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) in 2001, inviting a wide range of experts and stakeholders to discuss the future of the Bank's involvement in such projects. The final report (EIR, 2003) recommends that any future involvement by the World Bank in the oil, gas and coal sectors should be conditional upon putting in place mechanisms that ensure poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. It also calls for a rebalancing of the economic, social and environmental considerations of the Bank's lending. The report, which essentially proposes a moratorium on the Bank's lending in this sector, unleashed a heated debate within the Bank and beyond. The Bank's management has rejected this recommendation and, in August 2004, the board agreed with them, arguing that oil and gas development in developing countries is essential if they are to meet the Millennium Development Goals (IBRD, 2004).

Apart from the initiatives mentioned above, a number of smaller multilateral and unilateral arrangements aim to bring greater transparency and accountability to the use of oil revenues. These include arrangements to monitor the use of Azerbaijan's and Angola's oil revenues, as well as those of Chad and Cameroon. African states associated with New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have given similar undertakings.

to anything beyond voluntary arrangements. Even those that have wholeheartedly embraced greater responsibility, sensing a competitive advantage in their approach, are resisting arrangements that would create a more level playing field.

Activists have been divided in their approach to multinational oil companies. Anti-corporate groups, such as CorpWatch and Global Exchange, have been consistent and uncompromising in their pursuit of multinationals. They reject any notion of corporate

responsibility as whitewash and set out to expose it as such, not without success. The approach of prominent environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth is not dissimilar, as demonstrated by the Stop Esso campaign (Stop Esso, URL). ExxonMobil has been singled out by activists for its leading role in denying global warming and attempts to derail the Kyoto Protocol on climate change.

Other groups have been more forgiving, at times drawing the ire of CorpWatch and other radical groups.

Conservancy International and other NGOs joined with BP, Shell and Chevron, among other companies, in the Energy Biodiversity Initiative, which was launched in 2002 with the aim of developing technologies to integrate biodiversity concerns into upstream oil development (EBI, URL). A similar approach was adopted by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (see Box 4.5).

Watchdogs like Global Witness and Transparency International have combined the two approaches. They do not shy away from supporting initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative but keep a watchful eye on corporate transgressions in their financial dealings with corrupt governments.

Positions on globalisation

In previous chapters on the anti-capitalist movement, and finance and trade, we have tried to show how positions on globalisation shape the debates in which global civil society is engaged. The same framework can be applied to the oil debate.

Positions on oil can be mapped between two polar approaches: 'its all about oil' and 'oil has nothing to do with it'. Rejectionists and Regressives tend to take the first position while Supporters and Reformers are more sceptical.

Rejectionists

According to Rejectionists, who espouse the 'it's all about oil' position, there is a direct causal relationship between oil, environmental degradation, uneven development, human rights violations and war. Reverend Desmond Tutu, together with six other Nobel Peace Prize laureates, wrote to World Bank President James D Wolfensohn, urging him to phase out funding for oil and coal projects:

War, poverty, climate change, greed, corruption, and ongoing violations of human rights – all of these scourges are all too often linked to the oil and mining industries. (Nobel Laureates, 2004)

According to this line of thinking, an unholy alliance of multinationals, international finance institutions and Northern governments is perpetuating oil dependence at the expense of the environment and the poor, especially in the South. Thirst for oil is fuelling wars of aggression and Great Game confrontations. One of the

main slogans of the 15 February 2003 demonstration against the war in Iraq, the biggest in British history, was 'No Blood for Oil', suggesting that oil was the main motive behind the war.

According to this position, conflicts over oil will intensify because of the growing tension between global dependence on this source of energy and its gradual depletion. In order to quench an insatiable demand for profits and energy, superpowers and their oil companies are pursuing dwindling resources in all corners of the globe through increasingly aggressive methods. At the same time, energy-intensive models of development are drawing more and more developing nations into the fray, either as oil-dependent exporters such as Chad or as major oil importers such as China. Rejectionists argue that this struggle will come to a head in the next five years as oil production peaks while demand continues to spin out of control.

The proponents of the 'it's all about oil' arguments warn that current levels of oil production and consumption are bound to have cataclysmic environmental consequences, such as global warming, even before oil reserves are exhausted. As former British environment minister Michael Meacher wrote recently:

If we do not immediately plan to make the switch to renewable energy – faster, and backed by far greater investment than currently envisaged – then civilisation faces the sharpest and perhaps most violent dislocation in recent history. (Meacher, 2004)

This position is usually espoused by Rejectionists, who, according to a definition we developed in previous Global Civil Society yearbooks (Said and Desai, 2003), are civil society actors who equate globalisation with global capitalism, and reject both. At the heart of the Rejectionist argument is an inherent mistrust of markets, especially when it comes to public goods such as energy and the environment.

The Rejectionists oppose almost any form of oil development, whether it is a project, tanker or pipeline. In an echo of their demands in the areas of finance and trade, they call for 'energy sovereignty' and self-reliance. According to Rejectionists, access to energy is a human right that should be democratised and decentralised. It should be removed from the market to avoid economic forces that lead, inevitably, to injustice and environmental degradation (OilWatch, 2002).

The majority of activists on oil issues, especially environmental and indigenous people's groups that seek to block oil projects, can be classified as Rejectionists.

Table 4.2: Positions on globalisation and oil

	Globalisation is:	Position on globalisation	Position on oil
Supporters	Capitalism minus the state	Should be defended at all cost: the alternative is fascism	Oil has nothing to do with conflict, authoritarianism and state failure; market mechanisms can address oil shortage and global warming
Regressives	Capitalism plus the state	San work only under superpower hegemony	Securing oil supplies is a matter of national interest justifying extreme measures
Isolationists	Capitalism minus the state	Should be reversed – deglobalisation, localisation	Same as Regressives and therefore oil causes conflict, authoritarianism and state failure
Reformers	Capitalism plus transformed state	Should be humanised	Tension due to the anachronism of oil creates conflict – needs to be addressed with global warming through multilateral intervention

The polarisation which followed 9/11 and the war in Iraq meant that many activists have adopted Rejectionist positions.

Supporters

At the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that 'oil has nothing to do with it'. Regardless of the accuracy of the doomsayers' predictions, Supporters believe that market forces are perfectly capable of balancing the demand and supply of energy without recourse to war. If oil indeed becomes scarce, its price will rise, making alternative sources of energy more lucrative and encouraging investments in these areas. As Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the former Saudi oil minister, put it, 'The Stone Age did not end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out of oil' (Lovins and Lovins, 2002: page xx).

Proponents of this approach either reject doomsday scenarios related to global warming or suggest that environmental damage caused by oil consumption can be mitigated by creating a market where oil consumers can trade the right to pollute. If global warming is an established fact, pollution rights will become so expensive that they significantly depress consumption.

Supporters reject the link between oil, underdevelopment, human rights violations and wars, which they attribute entirely to human factors. They attack those who see a link between oil, underdevelopment and conflict for lack of rigour and improper use of data (Lewis, 1989).



The proponents of 'oil has nothing to do with it' approach are mostly Supporters, people who according to our prior definition equate globalisation with global capitalism and support it. Supporters have unlimited faith in the power of the invisible hand, especially if liberated from human meddling. Therefore, most of their policy prescriptions call for the removal of market-distorting policies, institutions, excessive fuel taxes and economically unjustifiable/premature government investment in oil alternatives. Likewise, they argue against the politicisation of oil and oil companies and their use as instruments for geopolitical and strategic interests. Supporters call for the reduction of transaction costs and creation of new markets to deal in oil externalities and uncertainties: for example, better information on proven reserves, larger strategic reserves and trading in greenhouse emissions (Coon, 2002). Supporters are a minority. They are concentrated in free-market think-tanks, academia and the liberal media. They include such personalities as Yamani and Yergin as well as the Heritage Foundation and The Economist.

Regressives and Reformers

Between the two extremes are the Regressives and the Reformers of our previous definitions. Regressives support a hegemonic, superpower-centred approach to globalisation. Despite their declared faith and commitment to free markets, they are prepared to interfere in their workings to produce a better outcome from a national interest point of view. Reformers believe in globalisation with a human face, democratic global governance and civil society. They openly doubt the ability of markets to deliver optimal outcomes and call for state intervention at national and global levels. In contrast to Regressives, however, they have in mind a transformed state working through multilateral organisations and in cooperation with civil society.

Both go some way towards accepting the notion of an impending crisis, but they differ in its explanation as well as in the emphasis they place on its aspects. Thus, Regressives are more concerned with the oncoming supply shortfall and the increased dependence on Middle East oil, while downplaying the environmental consequences of continued oil consumption. They use this analysis to embrace a more aggressive posture, justifying the accusations levelled against them by the Rejectionists.

Energy security must be a priority of US trade and foreign policy. We must look beyond our borders and

restore America's credibility with overseas suppliers. (NEP Development Group, 2001)

Like Supporters, they reject as excessive and market-distorting high fuel taxes and environmental regulation aimed at curbing oil production and consumption at home. By doing so, they implicitly shift the burden from oil consumers to producers. The largest demonstration in British history was organised by Rejectionists to protest the war in Iraq on 15 February 2003. In the autumn of 2000, mass protesters against fuel taxes brought Britain to a virtual standstill. These protestors adopted a Regressive position.

Regressives include conservative and neo-conservative think-tanks and groups, mostly concentrated in rich countries. The American Petroleum Institute and the Global Climate Coalition (see Box 4.4) represent Regressive positions.

Reformers are concerned with the anachronism of oil dependence and the political, economic and environmental dislocations that this continued dependence is likely to generate in the future. Unlike the Regressives, Reformers do not view physical shortage, market distortions and authoritarian Middle Eastern governments as the main source of future oil conflicts. They believe the problem emanates from the disconnection between oil dependence and the new technological and economic paradigm.

For Reformers, scarcity of oil is not a geological fact but rather a function of complex economic, political, technological and human factors.

The terms petroleum, crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids each have precise scientific definitions. But appending the word resource to any of them creates a term that crosses the boundary between science and social science and includes economics. Many geologists begin to feel uncomfortable in this area between science and social science. (Ahlbrandt and McCabe, 2002)

Reformers believe that market mechanisms alone are insufficient to encourage more sustainable sources of energy, and that regulation at national and global levels is needed to forestall impending crises and provide a more equitable outcome.

Reformers include many human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other NGOs working with governments and corporations to devise multilateral mechanisms to mitigate the impact of oil developments.

Conclusions

There is a contradiction between post-industrial, information-centred, weightless economies and a world economy still dependent on oil. Oil continues to fuel conflict in a variety of ways, but it is no longer the decisive factor in battle. Territorial conquest and authoritarian rule, once the main methods of securing oil supplies, are much more difficult nowadays.

Activists have played a significant role in ending the reign of oil as the engine of history. They can look at the past decade with pride. Human-induced global warming is now a broadly accepted fact. From Sudan to Colombia, activists have forced oil companies and governments to do the unthinkable – abandon oil development altogether or fundamentally revise projects to take activists' demands into consideration. Oil can no longer be delivered at any cost.

Yet many activists still espouse positions on oil coloured by nineteenth- and twentieth-century approaches. Doomsday prophecies of impending shortage and environmental cataclysm go hand in hand with new Great Game theories and other geopolitical

scenarios of world domination through the control of oil supplies.

Oil's continued domination of the world economy is in part a consequence of conscious effort by powerful social forces to retain their privileges. Some multinational oil companies and associated industries have a vested interest in perpetuating the reign of oil, regardless of the mounting environmental, social and political costs. Their allies are politicians who still harbour imperial ambitions based on military power and client regimes. Together, they are trying to keep oil at centre stage using the rhetoric of securing strategic supplies. Yet through their very actions, they are exacerbating conflict and destabilising oil markets.

Activists who insist that 'it's all about oil' may play unwittingly into the hands of their worst enemies by perpetuating their narrative. The question is: can this dynamic lead to deglobalisation by promoting imperial hegemony on one side and nationalist reaction on the other? And can deglobalisation prolong the reign of oil as a major strategic commodity? In other words, can the mutually reinforcing 'it's-all-about-oil' narrative become self-fulfilling?

REFERENCES

- Ahlbrandt, Thomas S. and McCabe, Peter J. (2002) 'Global Petroleum Resources: A View to the Future: *Geotimes*. 7(11): 14–18.
- AmazonWatch (2002) 'Newsroom Report: Civil Conflict and Indigenous Peoples in Colombia' (1 March). www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?id=638
- Auty, R. (1990) *Resource Based Industrialization: Sowing the Seeds in Eight Developing Countries*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) Campaign (2003) *Environmental and Human Rights Fact Finding Mission, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline – Turkey Section*. www.bankwatch.org/issues/oilclima/baku-ceyhan/downloads/ffm_turkey_all_03-03.pdf
- Cable, Vincent (2003) 'Saddam's Other Weapon of Mass Destruction: The Potential Economic Fallout from a War in Iraq', Global Dimensions Seminar, 10 February. www.globaldimensions.net
- Collier, P. and Höffler, A. (2001) *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Coon, Charli E. (2002) *Side-by-Side Analysis of H.R. 4* (WebMemo #145). Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 16 September. www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/WM145.cfm
- Cost of War (URL) <http://costofwar.com> (consulted 27 June 2004).
- CPA (URL) www.cpa-iraq.org (consulted 27 June 2004).
- Earthrights International (URL) www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (consulted 23 June 2004)
- EBI (Energy Biodiversity Initiative) (URL)
- EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) (URL) www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_statement.htm (consulted 24 June 2004).
- Gelb, A. (1988) *Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Global Climate Coalition (URLa) www.globalclimate.org/aboutus.htm (consulted 24 June 2004).
- (URLb) www.globalclimate.org (consulted 24 June 2004)

Table 4.3: Global civil society responses to oil

	Organisation					Activity					Position			
	Individual	NGO/group	Movement/network	Think-tank/academia	Media/website	Inform/educate	Lobby	Mobilise	Serve	Riot/celebrate	Rejectionist	Supportive	Reformer	Regressive
AfricaFiles			●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	
AmazonWatch			●			●	●	●	●		●		●	
American Petroleum Institute		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	●
Amnesty International		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
CEE Bankwatch		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Christian Aid		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Corner House		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
CorpWatch		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
EarthRights		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
EBI (Energy Biodiversity Initiative)			●			●	●	●	●		●		●	
Economist, The					●	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Environmental Defence		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Extractive Industries Review ^a						●	●	●	●		●		●	
Financial Times					●	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Friends of the Earth		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Global Climate Campaign			●			●	●	●	●		●		●	
Global Exchange		●			●	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Global Witness		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Greenpeace		●		●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Human Rights Watch		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
IBLF ^b		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Institute for Policy Studies				●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Kurdish Human Rights Project		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
MOSOP ^c			●			●	●	●	●		●		●	
Oil Watch			●			●	●	●	●		●		●	
Open Society Institute		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Sierra Club		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Transparency International		●				●	●	●	●		●		●	
Wall Street Journal				●	●	●	●	●	●		●		●	
Wolfenson, James	●			●		●	●	●	●		●		●	
Yamani, Ahmad Zaki	●			●		●	●	●	●		●		●	

a Commission
 b International Business Leaders' Forum
 c Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

● Predominant
 ● Significant
 ○ To some degree

Global Policy Forum (URL) www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/atcaindx.htm (consulted 23 June 2004).

Global Witness (1999) *A Crude Awakening: The Role of Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets*. www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00016.html

Greenpeace (1998) *Greenpeace Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol* (Greenpeace Briefing Paper). Bonn: UNFCCC Sessions of the subsidiary bodies Bonn, 2–12 June. <http://archive.greenpeace.org/climate/politics/reports/kyoto.pdf>

Heritage (URL) www.heritage.org (consulted 27 June 2004).

Ibeanu, Okechukwu (1999) 'Ogoni – Oil, Resource Flow and Conflict', in T. Granfelt (ed.), *Managing the Globalized Environment*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

IBRD (2003) *Striking a Better Balance – The World Bank Group and Extractive Industries: The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

– (2004) 'World Bank Group Board Agrees Way Forward on Extractive Industries Review', News Release, 3 August.

Kaldor, M., Anheier, H. and Glasius, M. (2003) 'Global Civil Society in an Era of Regressive Globalization' in Anheier et al. (eds) *Global Civil Society 2003*, London OUP

Karl, T. L. (1997) *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lewis, S. R. J. (1989). 'Primary Exporting Countries', Ch. 29 in Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds), *Handbook of Development Economics*, ii. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Lohman, Larry (2001) *Democracy or Carbocracy? Intellectual Corruption and the Future of the Climate Change Debate* (Briefing Paper 24). Sturminster Newton, UK: The Corner House. www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/pdf/briefing/24carboc.pdf

Lovins, Amory B. and Lovins, L. Hunter (2002) 'Energy Forever', *The American Prospect*, 2 November. www.prospect.org/print/V13/3/lovins-a.html

Meacher, Michael (2004) 'Plan Now for a World Without Oil', *Financial Times*, 5 January

NEP Development Group (2001) *National Energy Policy: Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.

Nobel Laureates (2004) Letter to James Wolfensohn, 9 February. www.eireview.info/doc/EIR%20Nobel%20Letter%20-%20New.pdf

Oilwatch (2002) 'Position Paper on Energy Sovereignty', The Eighth Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, New Delhi. www.wrm.org.uy/actors/CCC/energy.html

– (2003) Oilwatch declaration. World Social Forum 2003. Security vs. Sovereignty. www.wrm.org.uy/actors/WSF/oilwatch.html

Oliviero, M. and Simmons, A. (2002) 'Who's Minding the Store? Global Civil Society and Corporate Responsibility', in Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier (eds), *Global Civil Society 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Publish What You Pay (URL) www.publishwhatyoupay.org/resources/leaflet.pdf (consulted 24 June 2004).

Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (1997) *Statement of General Business Principles*. www.fbk.eur.nl/DPT/VG8/ETHICSMANAGEMENT/shell_code.pdf

Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1997) *Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth*. Cambridge, MA: CID, Harvard University.

Said, Y. and Desai, M. 'Trade and Global Civil Society: The Anti-Capitalist Movement Revisited', in Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius (eds), *Global Civil Society 2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1995) Closing Statement to the Military Appointed Tribunal. <http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/state.html#shell>

Schultze, Kirsten (forthcoming) 'The Conflict over Aceh: Struggle for Oil' in Kaldor, Mary and Said, Yahia eds. *New and Old Oil Wars*, London: Routledge

Sengupta, Somini (2004) 'The Making of an African Petro State', *New York Times*, 18 February.

Smith, A. (1776/1937). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York, Modern Library.

Stop Esso (URL) www.stopesso.org (consulted 24 June 2004).

The Coming Global Oil Crisis (URL) www.oilcrisis.com (consulted 24 June 2004).

Thomas, Mark (2003) 'If a British company proposed to upgrade and relocate Hell to Ethiopia, new Labour ministers would talk of creating jobs and having a constructive dialogue with Satan', *New Statesman*, 14 July.

UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2002) *A Guide to the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol*. Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat. <http://unfccc.int/resource/guideconvkp-p.pdf>

US Department of State (2000) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/001220_fsdr1_principles.html

Weber, M. (1914/1979) *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Yergin, Daniel (1991) *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

– (2002) 'A Crude View of the Crisis in Iraq', *Washington Post*, 8 December.

– (2004) 'Imagining a \$7-a-Gallon Future', *New York Times*, 4 April.